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Introduction

In a

competitive economic world,
1

insolvent.

If

it is

often the case that businesses

fail

and become

insolvent businesses are not protected by a specialized legal system, the

creditors of the debtor will break the businesses

up by liquidating them on the auction

block according to the traditional non-bankruptcy law.
of the business as a productive whole will be

to lose their jobs.

The

insufficient to repay

may

creditors

more than

lost; the

If

a business

is

liquidated, the value

workers and the managers are likely

find that the liquidation value of the debtor's assets

a fraction of their claims; unsecured creditors will often

receive nothing. If the creditors are not paid in full in liquidation, there will be nothing

for the equity shareholders.

The

therefore, will often be, economically

For

left

destruction of value caused by business liquidation will

Keeping a

accordingly reduce the total wealth of society.

liquidating

is

and

socially,

failing business in operation,

much more

efficient

and desirable than

it.

this reason,

most

legal regimes

have

their

own

legal rules dealing with the

consequences of business failures even though the rules do not necessarily constitute a

1

There are two kinds of insolvency: "balance sheet" insolvency and "equity" insolvency.

insolvent in the balance sheet sense

A

debtor

is

if

the

sum of the

insolvent in the "equity" sense

if

A debtor is

debtor's debts exceeds the value of the debtor's assets.

the debtor

is

unable to pay

its

debts as they

regardless of the debtor's ability to pay. In this article, the term "insolvency"

is

used

become due

in the

balance sheet

sense, unless otherwise identified.
2

In addition, the loss of jobs causes additional social costs such as increased

payments and decreased tax revenues. Although
positions

and

it is

may

eventually employ

all

it

is

unemployment insurance

possible that other business entities with similar

or part of the workers and managers, this does not happen immediately,

not cost-free. In the long run, society will pay a price for the liquidation of a business. This view

is

formal bankruptcy system.
4

Code, which

is

3

In

1978 Congress promulgated the United States Bankruptcy

also based on the premise that reorganization

When

economical than liquidation.

often

is

Congress created Chapter

1

1

emphasized

report

liquidation,

provide

its

is

that "[t]he

1 1

5
it

as a tool to

The House committee

purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a

to restructure a business 's finances so that

employees with jobs, pay

stockholders."

desirable and

of the Code,

envisioned that financially distressed businesses could use Chapter
reorganize and to continue their operations as a viable concern.

more

its

creditors,

it

may

continue to operate,

and produce a return for

its

6

However, business

rehabilitation

is

not cost-free. First, the debtor needs additional

resources to emerge from financial distress and continue

Before filing a bankruptcy petition, the debtor
undertaken other internal restructuring, but

may have

may be

its

business as a viable concern.

scaled back

its

failing nonetheless.

operation and

It

cannot increase

cash flow any further from internal restructuring. Resources necessary for the debtor to
survive then can only be obtained through an external infusion of capital. In most cases,

except the rare cases where the security equity holders invest
sources other than the creditors that can bear the risks of

called the "Social Benefit

new

new

capital, there are

capital infusion.

View." Paul B. Lewis, Bankruptcy Thermodynamics, 50

Fla. L.

7

no

Under

the

Rev. 329, 359

(1998).
3

4

Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 336, 344 (1993).

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-598, 92

5
1

6
7

1

Stat.

2549

[hereinafter the "Code"].

U.S.C. Sections 101 -1329 (1994).

at 215 (1977).
Most of the economic resources necessary

H.R. Rep. No. 95-595,

for debtor rehabilitation

and the administration of a case are

obtained in exchange for creditors' losses For example, the allowance of cross-collateral places financial
risks

on

creditors.

Case law shows

that

"major protections for secured and unsecured creditors

in

bankruptcy are being limited so that creditors can be forced involuntarily to infuse resources into troubled
firms." Paul B. Lewis, Bankruptcy

infusion

is

made

Thermodynamics, 50

Fla. L.

Rev. 329, 332 (1998). Such resource

possible by deviating from creditors' expectations of their legal rights, either by changing

contracts or limiting the creditors' rights established under non-bankruptcy law. Id.

The "automatic

stay,"

Code, most such economic resources can, therefore, be obtained
creditors' losses.

exchange for
8

interest.

in

exchange for

For example, discharge relieves the debtor of future financial burdens

creditors' financial losses, including the principal of the loan

and

in

its

Second, the administration of the case also involves costs. These costs include
investment banking, and debtor

legal, accounting,

in

possession fees and expenses. The

administrative costs, which should be paid prior to secured credits, reduce the debtor's

assets that

would otherwise be

available for distribution to the creditors.

The

total

amount

of these bankruptcy-related costs averages 10 to 20 percent of the debtor's prepetition

value.

If

9

a reorganization case ends up in success, keeping the debtor in operation as a viable

concern, such costs eventually born by the creditors can be justified to

because the costs were contributed to promote social benefit.

scheme presupposes

that the creditors'

economic

loss

are inevitable for the purpose of debtor rehabilitation.

the

same consequence,

which was designed
creditors. See, e.g.,

stating that "[t]he

and
8

extent

The reorganization

and attendant misuse of resources

The Supreme Court

also recognizes

fundamental purpose of reorganization

is

to

to give the debtor a breathing spell, also incurs lost opportunity costs to certain

United Savings Association

(1988) (holding that an undersecured creditor
sell collateral). In

compensation for

10

some

its

is

v.

Timbers of lnwood Forest Associates,

not entitled to the compensation for

its

Timbers, the Supreme Court held that an undersecured creditor

inability to seize

and

is

Ltd.,

484 U.S. 365

inability to seize

not entitled to the

sell collateral.

Hon. Howard Schwartzberg, Evaluating the Chapter 11 Process, 18 Westchester BJ.

15,

22-23 (1991).

See generally Paul B. Lewis, Bankruptcy Thermodynamics, 50 Fla. L. Rev. 329 (1998).
Franks. J.R. and W.N. Torous, A Comparison of Financial Restructuring in Distress Exchanges and
Chapter 11 Reorganization, Journal of Financial Economics (June, 1994), 349-370.
10
See generally, Lewis, supra note 8, at 359-64. Under the "social benefit view," business reorganization

law has a special role distinct from that of
interests. Id. at 359.

state law,

which

is

The goals of bankruptcy reorganization

should also include enhancing or

at least

designed primarily to protect the creditors'

law, while protecting creditors' interests,

preserving the value of a debtor; protecting certain parties

considered socially worth protecting, such as employees; establishing a means to collectivize debt
collection;

816

how to allocate the debtor's existing value. Id. at 359-60. See also Douglas G.
Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815,

and determining

Baird, Loss Distribution,

(calling the "social benefit view" the "traditional view" of bankruptcy policy).

prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible

misuse

If.

of

economic resources.

however, the reorganization efforts

distress, the

time and

money

fail to

make

the debtor

emerge from

spent on the administration of the case

financial

would be considered

merely wasted. The creditors must nonetheless bear such costs. The loss born by the

between the liquidation value

creditors would, theoretically, be the difference

time

at the

of filing and the value actually distributed to the creditors group after the unsuccessful

reorganization efforts.

to 10 to

The amount of the

20 percent of the debtor's prepetition

study, fewer than 30 percent

success.

costs incurred by a failing reorganization

13

1

"

assets.

Moreover, according

of the cases filing for reorganization relief culminated

where the reorganization

N.L.R.B.

v.

According

Chapter

1

1

and

Bildisco

cases of

14

efforts

Bildisco,

to the case statistics

the cases resulted in

Creditor protection becomes

end up

crucial in cases

1

in vain.

465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984).

of the Executive Officer for the U.S. Trustee

(EOUSTj. among

the

sizes filed in 15 judicial districts

in

Bankruptcy and Corporate Recover}. 17-May Am. Bankr.

This thesis considers a reorganization case to be successful

confirmed, unless otherwise specified.

avoidance of negative
different.

much more

trust in

from 1989 through 1995. fewer than 30 percent of
a confirmed plan of reorganization. David P. Bart & Scott Peltz. Rethinking the

all

Concept of "Success"
13

in

Indeed, the costs incurred by failing reorganizations and born by the creditors

bankruptcy reorganization law.

12

up

to an empirical

group are significant enough to damage not only the creditors but also the public

11

is

results,

If

"success"

by the debtor

at the

is

if

34

Inst. J. 1.

a plan of reorganization has

|

1998).

been

defined as the achievement of the results sought or the

time of

filing, the

success rate for Chapter

Reorganization cases voluntarily dismissed after the debtor achieved

its

1

1

cases

is

goals in filing average

approximately 40 percent of the reorganization cases surveyed. Hon. Samuel L. Bufford. What is Right
About Bankruptcy Law and Wrong About Its Critics. 72 Wash. U. L. Q. 829, 833 (1994). For various
definitions of success, see Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford. Patterns in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large. Publicly Held Companies. 78 Cornell L. Rev. 597. 599-600 1993).
14
Some commentators suggest the abolition of the reorganization scheme in its entirety. E.g.. Barry E.
Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation. 11 Cornell L. Rev. 439 (1992); Michael Bradley & Michael
Rosenweig. The Untenable Case for Chapter 11. 101 Yale L.J. 1043 (1992); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy
Case for Corporate Reorganization. 15 J. Legal Stud. 127 (1986); John D. Aver. Chapter 11: Uses and
Consequences. 4 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 493, 493 (1996). However, many commentators maintain that
of the Code is necessary because even businesses troubled enough to file for bankruptcy often
Chapter
(

1

1

This thesis attempts to discover the factors leading to such failures and to propose a cure.

It

argues that the basic structure of Chapter

structure,

is

it

is

expeditiously.

16

its

For example, the court can screen the debtors'

the court,

convinced

if

in

possession

rate of failure.

power of case management more

reorganization case proceeds too

is

of the Code, the debtor

The

thesis

possible to reduce the rate of unsuccessful reorganization

bankruptcy court exercises

it

1

one of the essential factors causing such a high

further asserts that

unless

1

The court can

far.

that such an

appointment

is

actively

if

the

and

filing for relief before the

also order the appointment of a trustee

useless.

The debtor screening

role of

exercised appropriately, can prevent debtors that are not worth reorganizing

from coming into the process, reducing the costs considerably. Appointment of a

trustee,

on the other hand, removes improper management while keeping viable businesses

in

operation, thereby also reducing the costs.

Chapter
debtor

in

II

of this thesis examines the basic structure of Chapter

1 1

of the Code, the

possession construct, to discover the factors leading cases to failure. This

chapter argues that most of the failing cases have resulted from problems connected to the

debtor in possession structure. In the ordinary course of events in most Chapter

while the debtor continues to operate

known

as the debtor in possession,

its

its

1

In cases

where reorganization

members of society should

efforts fail,

J.

Legal Stud.

it

would be

1 1

1,

&

Shoichi Tagashira, Should

We Abolish

why creditors and other
members of society forgive
See generally Karen Gross, Failure and Forgiveness:
difficult to explain

forgive nonpaying debtors. Creditors and other

This view emphasizing the bankruptcy courts' active role

traditionalist's

property as an entity

154 (1994).

nonpaying debtors in order to rehabilitate the debtors.
Rebalancing Bankruptcy System 4 (1997). See also Susan Block-Lieb,
Law, 6 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 471 (1998).
16

its

cases,

creditors suffer, for example, a lack of necessary

have a going concern value worth saving. Theodore Eisenberg

Chapter 11? The Evidence From Japan, 23

manage

business and

1 1

in the

A Humanistic

Vision of Bankruptcy

administration of a case

is

called the

view, as compared to the proceduralist's view, which focuses on procedure and the function

information about the debtor's financial conditions. Moreover, they are often apathetic to
the reorganization of the debtor because of, in part, the relatively high cost of

participation

compared

only exercises

right to

many

its

to their claims.

wide discretion

propose a plan for

in

at least

Under Chapter

1

1,

the debtor in possession not

operating the business, but also enjoys the exclusive

120 days.

17

As

a result, the debtor in possession has

incentives to take advantage of the process, such as abuses of the automatic stay

and other strategies delaying the process. That, to some extent, explains
businesses filing for reorganization relief

difficulties

even

after the plan has

fail to

reorganize or

fail to

why

so

survive the financial

been confirmed.

Chapter HI discusses the provisions restricting such discretion of the debtor
possession.

Under

They include

the court's

powers

administrating the case and limiting the discretion of the debtor in possession;

committee and the United States Trustee monitoring the debtor

and the potential of the appointment of a trustee or an examiner.
possession

is

a fiduciary for the creditors of the estate;

preserve and protect the assets of the estate

Among

the restricting methods, Chapter

of a vibrant market

in

the Code, there are several institutional devices restricting the debtor in

possession's seemingly absolute discretion.

creditors'

many

economy

in

III

21

20

in

18

the

possession;

19

In addition, a debtor in

therefore,

it

has a duty to

while prosecuting the case expeditiously.

22

deals mainly with the mandatory creditors'

reorganization law. See generally, Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's

Uncontested Axioms, 108 Yale L. Rev. 573 (1998).
17
1 1

18

U.S.C. Section

1

121(b) (1994).

See 11 U.S.C. Section 1107(a); 5 Collier on Bankruptcy^

1

107.1-1 107.3 (Lawrence P.

King

et al. Eds.,

th

15
ed. 1991); In re
19
1 1

20

See, e.g., In re

Comm'n
21

McClure, 69 B.R. 282, 289-90 (Bankr. N.D.

U.S.C. Sections

v.

1

102,

1

Sharon Steel Corp., 86 B.R. 455 (Bankr. W.D.

Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985).

In re Russell,

Ind. 1987).

103 (1994).

60 B.R. 42, 47 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1985).

Pa. 1988);

Commodity Futures Trading

committee and the fiduciary duties of the debtor

in

possession. Other restricting methods

will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.

Promulgating the Code

in

1978, Congress thought the mandatory unsecured creditors'

committee would curb the debtor
creditors'

committee has proved

balance between the debtor and

more

efficient

and

fair,

in

possession's powerful discretion. However, the

to

be an inadequate safeguard. In order to achieve a

its

creditors and to

was

the reorganization procedure

Congress granted the bankruptcy courts a stronger equity power

than ever by revising Section 105 of the

the revisions

make

Code

1986 and again

in

in

1994.

to eliminate the possibility of the debtor's stratagems

The purpose of

damaging

the

creditors.

The bankruptcy

courts' strong equity

issues discussed in Chapter IV.

Under

judicial functions, leaving the case

However, subsequent

to the

powers along with other statutory powers

the Code, the bankruptcy court

management

is

limited to

are the

its

task to the United States Trustee.

Code's promulgation

in

1978, the need for the court's active

participation in the process has been called for. Accordingly, the court's decisions have

recognized, for example, the debtor screening function of the court, such as the good faith

filing requirement.

include,

among

Other methods testing the debtor's

others, creditors' relief

of a case for "cause."

24

These methods

from the stay
will, if

23

eligibility for reorganization

and the conversion and dismissal

exercised appropriately, prevent debtors

not deserving reorganization from continuing futile yet expensive reorganization efforts,

thereby reducing unnecessary costs. In addition, the court can order the appointment of a

21

In re

23

Van Brunt, 46 B.R. 29, 30 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984).

1

1

U.S.C. Section 362(d) (1994).

1

1

U.S.C. Section

24

1 1

12(b) (1994).

trustee or an examiner. If appointed, the trustee normally replaces the debtor in

possession and can redress the problems caused by the current management.

examiner, on the other hand, can help the court and creditors

make

An

appropriate decisions

by giving them necessary information about the debtor's management and financial
conditions.

Chapter

V of the thesis discusses the roles of the trustee and the examiner in

reorganization process.

A

trustee replaces the debtor in possession,

managing

the

the day-to-

day operation of the debtor, and investigates the debtor's management and financial
situations with expertise, thereby helping the creditors

decisions.

It is

and the court make appropriate

often difficult to recognize the viability of a business apart from the

management, especially

in closely

held small businesses.

incompetent or dishonest management, for instance,
reorganization case.

It is

is

25

Therefore, the removal of

crucial for the success of a

likewise often the case that the appointment of a trustee brings

about the conversion of the reorganization case to a Chapter 7 liquidation case. This
implies either that the debtor should have been liquidated earlier or

management was inappropriate
Chapter VI concludes that

power or

to

if

manage

at least that the prior

the business.

the bankruptcy courts

discretion, the costs that creditors

more

actively exercise their equity

and the society eventually have

to

pay will

decrease dramatically. Taking into consideration the results that failing cases would bring

about,

it is

eliminated

obvious that nonviable debtors and those abusing the automatic stay should be

at

an early stage of the procedure.

See generally Donald R. Korobkin, Vulnerability, Survival, and the Problem of Small Business

Chapter

I

The Basic Structure of Chapter

A.

11

Balancing Conflicting Interests

The Chapter

1 1

process represents "a remarkable conciliation of interests.'"

reorganization case, for example, the debtor has an interest in
27

rehabilitation,

while

its

in this context, directly

employees as well

as

its

own

effective

creditors have an interest in the recovery of their claims in

A successful

proportion to the recovery of other creditors.

is,

its

In a

connected

to those of its

reorganization of the debtor

managers, officers, and other

equity shareholders. These interests are often contradictory;

creditors' recovery against the debtor

may, as a matter of course, detrimentally

possibility of successful debtor rehabilitation, for example. Chapter

reconcile these competing interests in a balanced

1 1

affect the

attempts to

manner under specialized

collection

rules.

In

promulgating Chapter

two competing

1 1

of the Code

interests of the parties

in

1978, Congress intended to balance these

by giving them an arena

negotiate and bargain. Therefore, whatever the eventual

debtor and

its

in

which the

outcome of

creditors themselves ultimately determine the

parties

the bargain, the

deployment of the assets of

Bankruptcy, 23 Cap. U. L. Rev. 413 (1994).
26

Brian Leepson,

A Case for the Use of a Broad Court Equity Power to

Reorganization, 12 Bankr. Dev.
27
28

See, e.g., United States

v.

J.

Facilitate

Chapter 11

775, 775 (1996).

Voile Elec, Inc. {In re Voile Elec, Inc.), 139 B.R. 451,

453 (1992).

Whitman, 101 B.R. 37, 38 (1989). Creditors in general are not necessarily interested
maximizing the debtor's viability. Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: a New Model for Corporate
See, e.g., In re

in

10

the estate and produce the plan.

29

Chapter

1 1

adopted the idea

that,

with appropriate

oversight and an effective committee of creditors, the debtor itself would be best suited to

reorganizing the failing business. With the leading role assigned to the debtor
possession, Chapter

The committee

is

1 1

devised the mandated statutory committee of unsecured creditors.

the primary counterpart to the DIP, having the right and duty to

negotiate a reorganization plan with the DIP. Chapter

that the

in

dynamics between the

creditors'

1 1

is

thus based on the assumption

committee and the DIP would produce the

necessary resources and incentive to effect the efficient and successful reorganization of

the debtor.

Under Chapter

1

1,

while the DIP and

its

creditors negotiate

and bargain over a

reorganization plan, the bankruptcy court, by and large, loosely oversees the lengthy

bargaining process. In principle, the court cannot be actively involved in the

administration of the cases. Rather, the court's role

is

limited to that of an adjudicator of

actual controversies requiring judicial intervention. Reorganizations are not

primarily to be the outcome of the judicial process,

the negotiation process held

by the disputing

but reflect the persuasive

parties themselves.

As

on the terms of the reorganization plan.

dynamics between the DIP and

creditors, but not the court,

31

power

in

a result, the role of

the bankruptcy court or the judge can be reduced to that of a bystander

parties mutually agree

assumed

if

the negotiating

Congress thought

would work best

in

that the

balancing

Reorganization, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 542 (1983).
29

See

1

1

U.S.C. Section 1121 et seq.

J.

Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65

Am.

Bankr. L.J.

213,

256(1991).
30

Peter F. Coogan, Confirmation of a Plan

Under

the Bankruptcy Code, 32

Case W. Res. L. Rev. 301,

348(1982).
31

J.

Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65

Am.

Bankr. L.J. 213, 215 (1991).

1

11

the

competing

interests, thereby

achieving the policies underlying Chapter

1

1

of the

Chapter

1

1

cases has

Code.
Unexpectedly, however, since 1978, the need for efficiency
called for the court's

more

in

active involvement in the administration of the cases. This

trend has arisen partly because creditors were often apathetic in overseeing the DIP.

bankruptcy court thus had to participate

process actively in order to complement

in the

the creditors' supervisory deficiencies. In United Savings Association

Inwood Forest Associates,

Ltd.,

32

The United

The

v.

Timbers of

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

stated that bankruptcy judges are, to a certain extent, required to be involved in the

management of Chapter

1 1

Early and ongoing judicial

process

is

to survive

protection,

on the

and

if

cases:

management of Chapter

1 1

cases

the goals of reorganizability

other, are to be achieved. In almost

is

essential if the

Chapter

1

on the one hand, and creditor

all

cases the key to avoiding excessive

administrative costs, which are borne by the unsecured creditors, as well as excessive interest

expense, which
case.

We

is

borne by

all

creditors,

recognize that Congress,

in

is

1978,

early and stringent judicial

amended

management of the

the bankruptcy laws with the intention

of removing bankruptcy judges from the administration of the debtor's estate. The purpose of
this

amendment was

to insure the impartiality of the

bankruptcy judges.

We do

not believe,

however, that Congress thereby intended to relieve the bankruptcy judge of the responsibility
of managing the cases before him in such a

Bankruptcy Code.

Beside the court's role

costs, the

way

in

case

to expedite the process

and reduce the

abuse of the process by the DIP calls for the court's active participation

abused bankruptcy law to protect

33

promote the objectives and goals of the

management

process. According to an empirical study,

32

to

33

34

in the

corporate managers, in most cases surveyed,

their positions

and the wealth of the insider

In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd. 808 F.2d 363 (5

th

Cir. 1987), aff'd,

484 U.S. 365 (1988).

373 (footnotes omitted).
Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 Yale
Id. at

34

L.J.

1043 (1992).

12

shareholders of a corporation.

phenomenon and

35

Even though what

the study

shows may not be

leaves "large areas of uncertainty and contention,"

it

a universal

sheds some

important light on the cost and effectiveness of business reorganization. The study

how much

demonstrates
debtor's

the

DIP

structure of Chapter

is

1 1

susceptible to abuse by the

management.

As discussed above,
adversary system.

37

the basic

scheme of Chapter

1 1

The goals of the adversary system

analogous to the

is

civil

are to discover the facts (in

reorganization cases the "facts" can be "value maximization") on which the dispute

based and,

if

attributes: party control

weave

parties

The system

appropriate, redress losses.

relies

and an independent decision-maker.

is

upon two fundamental
39

Under

the system, the

the process out of their actions and responses, with the expectation that a

vigorous interchange (the "interchange"
cases) between

them

is

analogous to "negotiation"

will lead to an optimal result.

court, instead remains relatively passive.

41

40

The

in reorganization

traditional decision-maker, the

In order for the adversary

system to succeed,

the adversaries should be equally able to obtain information and to present the case to the

court.

42

In reorganization cases,

interests are diverse.

35

Id. at

They

however, the creditors are many

are often apathetic to the case and,

in

number, and

their

more importantly, unable

to

1076.

36

Donald R. Korobkin, The Unwarranted Case Against Corporate Reorganization: A Reply to Bradley and
Rosenweig, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 669, 735 (1993).
7
The adversary system is a principle deeply rooted in Anglo-American law and originated from the
concepts of ordeal, battle, and wager of law. Zipes, infra note 38, at 1
3 & n. 14.
8
Greg M. Zipes, Discovery Abuse in the Civil Adversary System: Looking to Bankruptcy's Regime of
Mandatory Disclosure and Third Party Control over the Discovery Process for Solutions, 27 Cumb. L.
Rev. 1107, 11 12 (1996-1997) n. 13.
1

i9

40
41

Id, at 1112.

See

id.

See

id.

42

Id. at

1113.

1

13

obtain needed information about the financial or economic situation of the debtor. In

under the DIP structure of Chapter

contrast,

reorganization

is

assigned to the DIP, the

which the controlling power

11, in

DIP can

exercise

its

in

wide discretion while

operating the ordinary businesses of the debtor and making bankruptcy decisions.

wide discretion of the DIP and unbalanced access

to information are the

often lead a case to failure and as a result waste time and

The Debtor

B.

1

The Debtor

.

In

in

most Chapter

and continues

in Possession

Construct and

44

1 1

money.

Efficiency

cases, the debtor, as DIP, remains in possession of the business

to oversee operation of the

ongoing business.

that the debtor

is

In addition to operating the business, the

propose a reorganization plan for

The DIP

factors that

Possession Concept

have recognized a strong presumption
of the estate.

Its

main

The

at least

120 days

43

Bankruptcy courts also

entitled to

DIP

after the

retains significant control over both the business

remain

in

possession

retains the exclusive right to

commencement

of the case.

45

and the reorganization of the

business.

With respect
debtor.

43
1

1

46

4
-

1

1

In other words, the

U.S.C. Section

See, e.g..

to legal status or entity, the

1

DIP

is

1

is

regarded as the same entity as the

the preexisting debtor with modified rights and

107 (1994).

Committee ofDalcon Shield Claimants

U.S.C. Section

DIP

v.

A.H. Robins Co., 828 F.2d 239 (4

th

Cir. 1987).

121(a)(b) (1994).

DIP is a separate entity or the same entity as the
seem to reject the "separate entity theory" at least as a universally
applicable concept. See In re Chapel Gate Apartments, Ltd., 64 Bankr. 569, 576 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986);
N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984); In re Triangle Chemicals, Inc., 697 F.2d 1280,
th
1290 (5 Cir. 1983); In re Unishops, Inc., 543 F.2d 1017, 1018-19 (2d Cir. 1976). See generally Stephen
McJohn, Claims & Opinions: Person or Property? On the Legal Nature of the Bankruptcy Estate, 10
Bankr. Dev. J. 465(1994).
The

courts' opinions have been divided on whether the

debtor. Recently, courts' decisions

14

obligations. Section 1101(1) defines the

appointed,

47

DIP

as the debtor unless a trustee has been

and Section 101(12) defines the debtor as "the person or municipality

concerning which" a Chapter

case has been

1 1

48

filed.

DIP

business and the direction of the proceedings, the

In the question of

refers to the

business including managers, directors, and other officers.

Historical

2.

different

Under

forms of

controls the

management of

the

49

Background

Prior to the Bankruptcy

businesses.

who

Reform Act of 1978,

the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,

relief:

Chapter

50

a

DIP was allowed only

in small

reorganization law included two

X and Chapter XI.

Chapter XI had a relatively simple

procedure for restructuring unsecured debts, primarily intended for use by smaller
businesses.

51

Under Chapter XI,

retained control of the

the current managers, often the

company and had

substantial

and creating the terms of a reorganization plan.

autonomy

In contrast,

use by corporations with more complex capital structures.

owners of the business,

in

operating the business

Chapter

52
It

X was

intended for

represented a

more

complicated procedure, which restricted the influence of former management and
afforded substantial protections to the creditors both in the administration of the estate

47
48

49

See

1 1

U.S.C. Section

See

id.

Section 101(12).

Raymond

T.

Nimmer

1

101(1) (1994).

& Richard

B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance: Fiduciary Duties,

Business Judgment, Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 Bankr. Dev.

J.

1,

21 (1989).

50

The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed in 1978) [hereinafter the "Act"].
th
51
House Comm. on the Judiciary, Bankruptcy Law Revision, H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95 Cong., 1 Sess. 222
(1977) [hereinafter House Report].
52
Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong.,
SI

1st Sess.

(1973).
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and

in the

formulation of a plan.

53

replacing the current management.

and mismanagement

of the

Code adopted

managers

to

remain

The

in addition to the

unified the aspects of Chapter

1 1

Under Chapter X,

in

X

trustee

power

a trustee

was always appointed,

had broad powers

to investigate past fraud

to operate the business.

and XI of the Act into Chapter

the rule of Chapter XI,

1

54

In 1978,

of the Code.

1

Congress

55

Chapter

which generally allowed corporate

possession of the business and have the right to formulate a plan.

This ability of management to retain control of the business during a reorganization

case

1

1

.

is

part of an effort to increase the effectiveness of the reorganization under Chapter

When

Congress promulgated

this

Chapter,

it

presumed

honest, competent, and familiar with the business and

made them more

its

that

managers were basically

constituencies, which in general

qualified than a trustee in operating the business.

thought that the rule requiring appointment of a trustee in Chapter

56

Congress also

X cases brought about

undesirable results. Managers of larger corporations, losing confidence in remaining in

their positions, often tried to file for

Chapter X, or delayed
therefore

relief

under Chapter XI instead of

filing for relief altogether until the corporation lost its viability

became unable

the business under

bankruptcy

to reorganize.

Chapter

1

1

,

57

By

allowing managers to remain

Congress wanted

to

encourage managers

in control

and

of

to file for

bankruptcy reorganization earlier while the business was viable and thus offer the failing
business a better chance for survival. Moreover,

some commentators have suggested

even the creditors will often prefer to deal with managers they are familiar with

in

order

Eugene V. Rostow & Lloyd N. Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate Reorganization: Chapters
XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 Yale L.J. 1334, 1338 (1939).
53

54

Id.
5

The Code

also reflects aspects of Chapter XII of the Act, which

was applied

arrangements of non-corporate debtors. House Report, supra note 51,

at

to real property

223-24.

that

X and

1

16

and expenses necessary

to save the time

to

educate a trustee or other third party about the

CO

business and the problems involved.

3.

Roles of the Debtor

Upon commencement

in

Possession

of proceedings for reorganization under Chapter

Code, current management continues
appointed.

59

exceptions,

to operate

its

business as a

For most purposes, the managers of the business control.

61

the

DIP has

all

and powers, and performs

the rights

duties, of a trustee appointed in a case

under the Code.

a strong presumption in favor of the

DIP continuing

is

management

incompetent or dishonest.

is

operation of the business, but

it

also

The DIP continues

engage

to

"

Unlike a

Id. at

233.

Id. at

233-34.

,8
58

See Peter

Bills,

59
1 1

F.

30 Bus.

Coogan
C
L.,

U.S.C. Sections

WWG Industries,

1

Inc.),

debtor obtains the
60

et

149,

1

For purposes of

1

ai.

The exceptions

trustee.

See

1 1

1 1

the functions and

trustee,

however, there

The DIP thus not only continues

the ongoing

64

65

The

course of the

transactions include

Comments on Some Reorganization Provisions of the Pending Bankruptcy

156 (1974).

104(a),

1

107(a) (1994). See also

772 F.2d 810, 811

this thesis,

debtor.

th

(11

WWG Industries,

Cir. 1985)

(upon the

Inc.

filing

v.

United Textiles,

of the Chapter

1

1

Inc. (In re

petition, the

both the officers and the directors are considered to be part of the

Nimmer

& Feinberg, supra

note 49, at 21 (describing

management

as "the

and business managers").

are related principally to the right to compensation and the investigative functions of a

U.S.C. Section

U.S.C. Section

1

1

107(a) (1994). See also Practising

Law

776 PLI/Comm 925, 928 (1998).
107(a) (1994). The Code prescribes a trustee's

Bankruptcy Code-Chapter
62

With some

in the transactions that arise in the ordinary

officers, directors, retained professionals
61

60

is

"debtor-in-possession").

title

management of the

unless a trustee

to operate the business unless

debtor's business unless the bankruptcy court orders otherwise.

57

all

of the

1

the driving force behind the negotiation and

is

formulation of the reorganization plan.

56

DIP

1

J

Institute,

Reorganization Under the

,

rights,

powers, and duties

first

and

then, for convenience, quotes the provisions regarding a trustee to the DIP.
63

See, e.g.. In re Ford,

64

36 B.R. 501 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983).
in Chapter II Reorganizations: Reducing Costs, Improving Results, 73

Edward S. Adams, Governance
B.U.L. Rev. 581,592(1993).

65
1 1

U.S.C. Section 363(c)(1) (1994).
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the use, sale, or lease of the property of the estate.

66

Only those actions

ordinary course of business require the bankruptcy court's approval

business decisions,

not be intervened.

if

67

in

arising outside the

advance.

A

DIP's

they are based on the exercise of rational business judgment, will

Under

the business

exercised proper business judgment

judgment

when

its

test,

a

DIP

will

be found to have

judgment made

act involves a business

in

/TO

good
in

faith

on a reasonable

operation

gives the

scope of

its

Keeping the business

authority.

essential for the debtor in reorganizing the business successfully because

is

DIP time

while the case

basis, within the

to reorganize

and preserves the going concern value of the business

lasts.

In addition to

engaging

in the

day-to-day business, the

DIP has

rights

related to enhancing or preserving the value of the bankruptcy estate.

holding property of or owing

debtor,

69

money

to the debtor's estate

must turn

security interests that

would be

70

The DIP may

For instance, parties

it

over to the

also seek to recover certain

were made before the bankruptcy

unfairly preferred over others.

71

filing,

In addition, the

burdensome,

72

including collective bargaining agreements.

less than

payments or

on the ground

that

one

DIP may assume and

perform advantageous executory contracts and unexpired leases and
are

and powers

and the DIP may void certain unperfected transfers and transfers for

reasonably equivalent value.

creditor

may

reject those that

73

66

Id.
67

See, e.g.,

Richmond Leasing Co.

v.

Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303,131

the bankruptcy court did not clearly err

by finding

that the

In re Southern Biotech, Inc., 37 B.R. 318,

69

11

U.S.C. Section 542 (1994).

Id.

Sections 544, 548.

Id.

Section 547.

70
71

72

/^.Section 365.

73

Id.

Section 1113.

th
1

(5

Cir.

1985) (ruling that

assumption of the amended lease was a proper

exercise of the debtor's business judgment).
68

it

322 (Bankr. M.D.

Fla. 1983).
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While continuing

DIP

to operate the business

and enhancing the value of the

also negotiates the reorganization bargain with

the procedure. In the course of the negotiation, the

estate, the

creditors and other participants in

its

DIP makes decisions

that involve

choices about whether to proceed with the negotiation or liquidate the business. In

addition, the

DIP makes

decisions about the

manner

in

which the

assets

and losses of the

business will be allocated. Such decisions should be included in the reorganization plan.

The DIP furthermore has

the right and

power

to sell all or part of the assets outside

the ordinary course of business after meeting certain requirements.

appoint professionals to perform functions for the estate

sued

in the

same manner

4

76

It

has the power to

and the standing

as a trustee under Section 323 of the Code.

77

to sue or

The DIP

is

be

also

subject to the duty to disclose the financial condition of the debtor by periodic reporting

to interested parties;

78

the duty to protect and preserve the assets;

79

and the duty

to

prosecute the case in an expeditious manner.

Efficiency of the Debtor in Possession Construct

4.

In

designing Chapter

control to

74

some degree

Id.

Section 1322.

Id.

Section 363

75

of business

if

it

th

(5

Cir. 1986),

76

79
80

,

Congress recognized the need for the debtor

order to encourage the debtor to

Under section 363 of the Code,

the

DIP can

file for

to

remain

bankruptcy

sell the assets

in

relief in

outside the ordinary course

has an "articulated business justification," In re Continental Air Lines, 780 F.2d 1223, 1226

and provides adequate notice

11

U.S.C. Section 327 (1994).

Id.

Section 323.

77
78

(b).

in

1 1

to all creditors,

and

if

a hearing

is

held on the sale.

U.S.C. Section 704(7)(8).

See

1 1

See

id.

Section 704(2); In re Nautilius of New Mexico, Inc., 83 B.R. 784, 789 (Bankr. D.

See

1 1

U.S.C. Section

1

N.M.

106 (1994); In re Van Brunt, 46 B.R. 29, 30 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984)

1988).

.
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time while the business

still

had a going concern value.

81

The

DIP

benefits inherent in the

concept were described by Congress:
The public and

the creditors will not necessarily be

possession in a reorganization case .... In

by continuation of the debtor
be required, and the debtor,
it

in

fact,

harmed

if

the debtor

is

continued

in

very often the creditors will be benefited

possession, both because the expense of a trustee will not

who

is

during the reorganization case.

A

familiar with his business, will be better able to operate
trustee frequently has to take time to familiarize himself

with the business before the reorganization can get under way. Thus, a debtor continued in

possession

may

lead to a greater likelihood of success in the reorganization.

The DIP construct

is

82

thus based upon the assumption that a debtor can be reorganized

most effectively when the management of the debtor

retains control of the business

during a reorganization case. The managers are more likely to attempt to reorganize the
debtor earlier, while the business

reorganized,

if

they have

is still

viable and therefore capable of being

some confidence

are also expected to be able to control the

their

in

remaining

in their positions.

83

The managers

ongoing operations of the business,

utilizing

experience and contacts.

However, the DIP construct

is

not free from defects.

84

In general, the

has provided a ground for questioning the credibility of the Chapter

whose conduct

likely contributed to

1 1

DIP

construct

process.

and precipitated the debtor's financial

Managers

difficulties

continue to manage the debtor in bankruptcy. These same individuals, therefore,

may

not

best be entrusted with protecting the interests of creditors and equity shareholders and

rehabilitating the business they

had mismanaged. Indeed, there are reorganization cases

caused by fraudulent, inept, inefficient, and poor management. Nevertheless, Congress,

81

House Report, supra note 5

82

Mat 233.

83

W.

at

231.

1

,

at

23 1

in

'

20

designing the 1978 Code, responded that "the need for reorganization of a public

company today

often results from simple business reverses, not from any fraud,

dishonesty, or gross

mismanagement on

Obviously, however, there are

many

the part of the debtor's

businesses whose

management."

management has caused such

financial difficulties.

In addition to these

concept

is

problems attributed

flawed because there

is

86

On

contended that the DIP concept has proven

Moreover,

in the

Real problems arise

is

this point,

for advancing the

some commentators have

be pragmatically superior to requiring the

to

in the best interests

of rehabilitation and reorganization.

1994 Amendment, Congress vindicated the DIP concept adopted

1978 despite such criticism.

The DIP

DIP, one could argue that the DIP

no independent party responsible

reorganization on an expeditious basis.

appointment of a trustee and

to the

in

88

when

a

DIP makes

decisions about the evaluation of the debtor.

often inclined to choose reorganization over liquidation even

unfit for reorganization. Regardless of

commencement of the

whether or have been retained

case or have been newly hired, the

if

the debtor

84

elects to reorganize a business that

management of the DIP would

W.

Int'l

L.

J.

113 (1994).

44 S.C.

L. Rev. 907,

909 (1993). "Business reorganization,

like firewalking, is best

Parties have sharp, inherent conflicts of interest over the conduct of both the business

M. LoPucki, Chapter

An Agenda for Basic Reform, 69 Am.

11:

Bankr. L.

J.

in

Chapter

done quickly.

and the case." Lynn

573, 574 (1995)

Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 Yale L.J. 437, 465-79 (1992)

(contending against the repeal of Chapter
88

a

not economically viable and should be

Barry L. Zaretsky, Symposium on Bankruptcy: Chapter 11 Issues: Trustees and Examiners

11,

87

If

See generally Anne M. Burr, The Unproposed Solution to Chapter 11 Reform: Assessing Management

Responsibility for Business Failures, 25 Cal.
85
Id. at 233.
86

is

is

after the

be apt to exaggerate the viability of the debtor because they want to retain their jobs.

DIP

87

See

1

1

U.S.C. Section

1

107(a) (1994).

1 1

in the

absence of a better alternative).

21

liquidated, such reorganization efforts are very likely to be unsuccessful. All the parties in

interest,

mostly the creditors, will bear the resulting costs incurred by the useless attempts

of reorganization. Similarly, the

the various claimants.

and

loses, the

game

It

DIP

will face the difficult task of allocating losses

serves as an arbitrator in a zero

involves choices between a

example, equity holders have the lowest priority

sum game.

Deciding

number of competing
in

interests.

among

who wins
For

bankruptcy and thus are unlikely to

receive anything in a liquidation. Accordingly, they have a strong incentive to encourage

keeping the business

in operation despite

economic

realities.

Unsecured creditors with

lower priority have a similar incentive to prefer reorganization to liquidation.

By

contrast,

secured creditors are likely to choose the liquidation of the business regardless of whether
the business has a going concern value, because the going concern value of the debtor has

nothing to do with the secured creditors. The secured creditors

may

costs caused by even a failing reorganization case. Therefore, the

related to unsuccessful reorganization cases

DEP's seemingly absolute discretion

in

would be

is

89

most

the following:

operating the business;

debtor's business without influence of the DIP; and

nevertheless bear the

how

how

crucial issues

how

to restrict the

to evaluate the

to access exact information that

under the control of the DIP.

According

another.

to the zero

sum game,

dollars allocated to one group in a reorganization case are lost by

Chapter

II

Restricting the Debtor in Possession

There are several sources restricting the DIP's seemingly uncontrollable discretion

and powers. They include the

power

court's

case;

92

creditors'

committee monitoring the DIP;

limiting the discretion of the DIP;

91

the business.

94

93

and the court's order prohibiting the

In addition to these restricting sources, a

fiduciary for the estate, including the creditors of the debtor.

DIP

is

derived from the fact that a

DIP

represents the estate.

enumerated above, fiduciary duties and the
while others are examined

A.

in

by the Code.

96

trustee appointed in a case

92

th

a

fiduciary duty of a

Among

the sources

committee are discussed below,
roles.

Section

1

rights, duties,

107(a) of the

under Chapter

Code

of the

1 1

and powers for the debtor, which
places a

Code

DIP

in virtually

in the

shoes of a

every way. The DIP

1 1

U.S.C. Section

1

107(a);

5 Collier on Bankruptcy f 1 107.1-1 107.3 (Lawrence P. King et
McClure, 69 B.R. 282, 289-90 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987).

al.

Eds.,

ed. 1991) [hereinafter Collier]; In re

11 U.S.C. Section

93

1112(1994).

Id.

Sections 1104-1106.

Id.

Section 1108.

94
95

is

U.S.C. Sections 1102, 1103(1994).

11

See

15

The

DIP

Fiduciary Duties

are defined

91

creditors'

95

Chapter IV as part of the courts'

The creation of a DIP engenders new

90

the bankruptcy

the conversion or dismissal of the

the appointment of a trustee or an examiner;

DIP from operating

90

See, e.g., In re

Comm'n

v.

Sharon Steel Corp., 86 B.R. 455 (Bankr. W.D.

Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985).

22

Pa. 1988);

Commodity Futures Trading

23

must perform the functions and

therefore

duties, including the fiduciary duty, of a trustee,

with a few exceptions such as investigative duties.

that

a trustee

is, if

is

97

"[I]f a debtor

remains

in

not appointed-the debtor's directors bear essentially the

fiduciary obligation to creditors and shareholders as

would

possession-

same

the trustee for a debtor out of

possession .... Indeed, the willingness to leave debtors in possession

'is

premised upon

an assurance that the officers and managing employees can be depended upon to carry out

the fiduciary responsibilities of a trustee.'"

The term
confidence,

fiduciary duty

trust,

and good

the bankruptcy context

DIP owes
the estate.

99

faith.

The

relationship that creates such a fiduciary duty in

between the DIP and the constituents of the

a fiduciary duty to the bankruptcy estate and
100

In a solvent corporation, the

most

all

parties

who

estate.

The

hold an interest

in

managers owe fiduciary duties of care and

states, to its shareholders,

101

but not to

its

creditors. In

under the DIP concept the directors and managers of the DIP have an expanded

responsibility to

96

generally used to describe a relationship involving

is built

loyalty to the debtor and, in

contrast,

is

98

all

See 11U.S.C. Section

parties that

1

comprise the bankruptcy

estate,

102

including the

107(a) (1994).

97

Id.
98

Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n

v.

Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985) (quoting Wolf v.

Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 651 (1963)).
99

Restatement (second) of Trust Section 2 cmt. B (1959) ("A person in a fiduciary relation to another
under a duty to act for the benefit of the other as to matters within the scope of the relation.").
100

John T. Roache, The Fiduciary Obligation of a Debtor

in

Possession, 1993 U.

111.

is

L. Rev. 133, 133

(1993).

Deborah A. DeMot t Fiduciary Obligation, Agency and Partnership: Duties in Ongoing Business
West Publishing Co. (1991) at 4.
102
See, e.g., Henderson v. Buchanan (In re Western World Funding, Inc.), 52 B.R. 743, 763 (Bankr. D.
Nev. 1985) (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939) ("[When a] corporation is insolvent, [a
th
manager's legal] duties run to creditors.")); FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4 Cir. 1982)
1

Relationships American casebook series,
,

("When

the corporation

becomes

to the creditors.") cert, denied,
[1]

(1999).

insolvent, the fiduciary duty of the directors shifts

from the stockholders

461 U.S. 928 (1983). See also Collier Business Workout Guide Section 3.03

24

creditors.

103

Some commentators

(the debtor in possession)

.

.

.

who

hold an immediate financial stake

corporation, however, because the firm's assets are inadequate to pay off

the claims of the creditors take

on a significance akin

The majority of bankruptcy courts have required
106

all

of

that a

DIP justify

its

is

of care and loyalty that corporate directors and officers

owe

to their corporation

shareholders.

107

The duty of

loyalty, for

contrast, an

uninformed decision

is

decision-making process and, as a

Chapter

103

1,

1

estate preservation

See, e.g., In re Central Ice

Cream

held to the same standards

The duty of care

and

its

requires directors to use

make an informed and knowledgeable

made when

result,

the

DIP

is

decision.

grossly negligent in

makes a bad decision

110

in light

Co.,

836 F.2d 1068

th

(7

Cir.

Equity Sec. Holders

Johns-Manville Corp.), 52 B.R. 879, 885 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1985) (stating

In

of the goals of

1987) (addressing that the debtor
v.

109

its

and creditor protection. Under the business judgment

possession has a duty to maximize the value of the estate); Manville Corp.
(In re

105

example, prohibits directors from using their

positions of trust and control for self-dealing.

reasonable efforts and procedures to

debts,

actions under

DIP

Under

its

to those of the shareholders."

this rule, the

the corporate fiduciary standard.

in the

hold such a stake. In an insolvent

In the solvent corporation, the shareholders

entity.

trustee

stems from the notion that a corporate entity should be

operated to respond to the interests of those
104

"expanded fiduciary duty of the

assert that such

rule,

in

Comm.

that the debtor in

"bound to act in the best interest of the corporation [and] as fiduciary] of the estate").
Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter II Reorganizations: Reducing Costs, Improving Results, 73
B.U.L. Rev. 581, 611-12 (1993). See Raymond T. Nimmer & Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business
Governance: Fiduciary Duties, Business Judgment, Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 Bankr. Dev. J. 1, 31-32

possession

is

(1989).
105

Id.
106

See, e.g.,
107

Richmond Leasing Co.

See, e.g., In re Schipper,

v.

Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 131

933 F.2d 513, 515

108

th
1

(5

Cir. 1985).

th

(7

Cir. 1991).

Harry G. Henn & John R. Alexander, Laws of Corporations Section 235, at 627 (3d ed. 1983). See also
William A. Klein & J. Mark Ramseyer, Business Associations, at 299 (1991); Robin E. Phelan, Is the Fox
Guarding the Henhouse: Corporate Governance Issued for the Financially Troubled Company, 709

PLI/Comm

739, 752(1995).
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which

the core of corporate fiduciaries' duty of care, the

is

before making a decision, but
111

interested parties.

its

decision,

judgment.

112

a duty to be informed

has no duty to reveal the information to any of the

the rule, as long as the

and the decision

is

DIP

articulates a reasonable basis for

not arbitrary or capricious, the court will not blame

its

113

The corporate
making.

Under

it

DIP has

Its

fiduciary standard thus gives the

DIP much leeway

decision can pass the court's review unless

fraud, illegality, self-dealing, or

is

uninformed."

114

it is,

in its decision-

for example, "tainted

The reasons

that courts

by

have given

debtors this enlarged discretion include expediting the administration of a case and

minimizing the cost

to the estate,

court of administrative duties,

actively.

117

standard.

The nature and

and allowing the DIP

116

relieving the

to operate the business

the trust, they are determined

v.

that a

DIP may be held

to is the

extent of the powers and duties of a

determined by the terms of the

Smith

promoting the negotiating process,

more

118

Another fiduciary standard

109

115

119

trust.

In the

common

in the

terms of

169-96 of the

in section

(Del. 1985). See Corinne Ball

law trustee

law trustee are

absence of any provisions

by rules such as those stated

Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873

common

& Robert L.

Messineo,

A Primer, 971 PLI/Corp.

Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors of the Financially Troubled Company:
171 (1996).
110
111

Smith

v.

Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873

(Del. 1985).

John T. Roache, The Fiduciary Obligation of a Debtor

in

Possession, 1993 U.

111.

L. Rev. 133, 148

111.

L. Rev. 133, 133

(1993).
112

See In re Johns-Mansville Corp., 60 B.R. 612, 616 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1986).

113

Id.
114

John T. Roache, The Fiduciary Obligation of a Debtor

in

Possession, 1993 U.

(1993).
115

"6

Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 1311
Lyon & Reboli, Inc., 24 B.R. 152, 154 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1982).

See, e.g.,

In re

1,7

m
"9

Id.
Id.

Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 164 (1959).

th

(5

Cir. 1985).

26

Restatement (Second) of Trusts.
those of a

common

care and

123

trust,

125

skill,

In

comparison with the corporate fiduciary obligations,

law trustee are more stringent duties of loyalty and care.

law trustee bears a duty
preserve the

"

to furnish information within a reasonable time,

a duty to defend and enforce claims,

and a duty

124

1

a duty to

a duty to exercise reasonable

to deal impartially with the beneficiaries.

126

Although the majority of the courts abide by the business judgment rule
of duty of care,

some bankruptcy

common

Bankruptcy Court of the Western District of
stringent standard of fiduciary duty.

quantum of care

in the areas

courts implicitly have held not only bankruptcy trustees

but also DIPs to the fiduciary duties of a

exercise the

A common

"

that a

The

law

127

trustee.

New York

In In re Frankel,

State held the

DIP

to a

n%

the

more

court held that the corporate officer had a duty to

person of ordinary intelligence and prudence would

exercise in caring for creditors' collateral. Further, the court stated, "[a] breach of this

duty, whether

some

knowing or

negligent, could result in liability attaching."

129

other courts have held that the most important fiduciary duty of the

the courts

and creditors informed of the

status of the business

Moreover,

DIP

is

to

keep

under reorganization.

130

120

Id.
121

Id.

Sections 170, 174.

7,4.

Section 173.

122
123

Id.

Section 176.

Id.

Sections 177-78.

Id.

Section 174.

Id.

Section 183.

124
125

126
127

See, e.g., In re Frankel,

exercise the
Indus., Inc.,

11 B.R. 401 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1987) (holding

that the

same care that a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence would
52 B.R. 241 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1985); In re Cochise College Park,

DIP

has a duty to

exercise); In re Roblin
Inc.,

703 F.2d 1339

th

(9

Cir. 1983).
128

n9
130

77 B.R. 401 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1987).
Frankel, 77 B.R. at 404.
E.g., In re

UNR

943, 954 (Bankr.

Indus., Inc.,

W.D.

42 B.R. 99, 101 (Bankr. N.D.

111.

Modern Office
W.D. Ky. 1983).

1984); In re

Okla. 1983); In re Ford, 36 B.R. 501, 504 (Bankr.

Supply, Inc.,

1

27

The bankruptcy

court in In re

McClure

i3i

held that the disclosure of the debtor's financial

condition by periodic reporting to interested parties

of the

DIP and

in the

context of two categories: that a

is

high on the

be excused only for justifiable cause.

to

that the obligations

is

DIP may be

132

list

of fiduciary duties

These cases can be analyzed

held liable for negligent decisions and

of the DIP include the duty to reveal necessary information.

together, these cases basically hold the

DIP

to the fiduciary duties of a

common

133

Taken

law

trustee.

The bankruptcy courts have held

the

DIP

to

more

stringent fiduciary standards than

those typically imposed upon non-bankruptcy corporation fiduciaries.

trustee's fiduciary obligations are almost identical to those of a

DIP

a

is

in the

shoes of a trustee

obligations similar to those of a

in

law

however, between the two fiduciary duties.

mere negligence,

but,

the beneficiaries

all

trustee.

common

law trustee

rule, a

DIP

is

31

133
134

may

liable

be held liable for
only for gross

136

The

135

a

DIP has

courts' holdings

Ind. 1987).

See the cases cited

in

supra note 130. See also Restatement (Second) Section 173 (1959).

Daniel B. Bogart, Liability of Directors of Chapter II Debtors in Possession:

May Be

Gaining on You,

"

68 Am. Bankr.

See In re Schipper, 933 F.2d 513, 516 (7

th

L.J. 155,

Cir. 1991);

See Smith

v.

Van Gorcom, 488 A.2d 858, 873

"Don 't Look Back

—

185 (1994).

Restatement (Second) of Trust Section 170(2),

Section 173(1959).
136

and

289.

Something
135

trustee,

subject to fiduciary

material facts that might affect the value of the assets,

69 B.R. 282 (Bankr. N.D.
Id. at

law

1

law trustee traditionally has a duty to disclose

only the duty to be properly informed before making a decision.

132

is

The Chapter

There are some differences,

A common

under the business judgment

negligence. In addition, while a

common

almost every event. Thus a DIP

common

134

(Del. 1985).

to

28

in

many

cases

137

indicate that there

is at

least a trend

among some bankruptcy

courts

toward the need for more stringent fiduciary duties on the part of the DIP.

The functions of

the fiduciary duties of the

DIP

are twofold: they represent the logical

grounds for statutory duties of the DIP, and they provide the basis for the DIP's
to the estate

and

its

constituencies. If the managers of a

are personally responsible for the

activities.

The

damages caused by

duty of the DIP,

1

.

The

fail to

meet the

duties, they

their intentional or negligent

courts ultimately decide the scope of the duties and the degrees of care and

loyalty through interpretation of the

B.

DIP

liabilities

its

Code.

If the

discretion in reorganization

courts

expand the scope of the fiduciary

would accordingly be

restricted.

Creditors' Committee

General Description

Chapter
indiscretion.

1 1

138

created several methods designed to oversee the

Committees of several kinds, such

equity shareholders' committee, are

DIP and

as the creditors'

some of the methods. Most

to prevent

its

committee and the

importantly, Congress

established a mandatory creditors' committee to represent unsecured creditors and

"investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the

operation of the debtor's business and the desirability of the continuance of such

business, and any other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan

137

." 139
.

.

.

See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); Smith v.
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
138
The role of a creditors' committee is not limited to such a supervisory role. "A well-functioning creditors'
committee can contribute to building consensus around sound and fair solutions to business problems more
effectively through its mediative power than as an advocate for a particular interest." Daniel J. Bussel,
Coalition-Building Through Bankruptcy Creditors' Committees, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1547, 1550 (1996).
139
1 1

U.S.C. Section

1

103(c)(2) (1994).

29

Secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and equity owners
substantially different channels of control or influence

for secured creditors

is

based on their

in

Chapter

1

1

have

on a case. The main control source

lien or property interest in collateral.

use the assets of the estate in the ordinary course of business, but
property are ultimately limited by the secured creditors' interests.

The DIP can

rights to use the

its

140

In addition, a

reorganization plan cannot be confirmed unless secured creditors receive under the plan

at least the

value of their collateral.

141

Unlike secured creditors, unsecured creditors and

equity owners have no rights in specific property. Instead, they can individually respond

and exercise informal

to issues presented for a vote, file claims, raise issues for litigation,

persuasion.

The

creation of such representative committees thus helps the creditors and

equity owners systematically and effectively protect their interests.

Among

the various

possible committees, an equity shareholders' committee has a strong incentive to

reorganize the debtor, often regardless of the debtor's viability. In particular, in cases of

closely held companies, such a committee shares the

same

interests as the

DIP.

It

would

therefore suffice for the purposes of the thesis to discuss the creditor committee alone

because

attempts to discover

this thesis

some methods

that are appropriate for restricting

the DIP's discretion in order to reduce the rate of unsuccessful reorganization.

reasons, the secured creditors' committee

140

See

S.Ct.
141
1 1

1 1

is

also not a

main focus of

U.S.C. Section 362; In re Timbers oflnwood Forest, 808 F.2d 363 (5

626(1987).
U.S.C. Section

1

129(b) (1994).

For similar

this thesis.

th

Cir. 1987), aff'd,

108

30

The Unsecured

2.

Under section

Creditors'

Committee

102(a)(1), the United States Trustee

1

unsecured creditors' committee

in

every Chapter

1 1

must appoint

reorganization case unless the court

orders for cause that one not be appointed in a small business case.

order the appointment of additional committees

interest adequately.

in

mega cases.

144

143

However,

Whether

in practice,

it

multiple committees are

power

United States Trustee's creditors' committee appointments

discretionary

power

in

States Trustee to alter

managing a

case,

selected

"

1

is

to

The

court

from the debtor's seven

uncommon, except

review and

alter the

controversial. In light of

can be said that the court

it

may

order the United

finds that the original

145

largest unsecured creditors.

Dispensing with the appointment of a creditors' committee

in a

146

to serve

143
1

1

U.S.C. Section

W.

1

Inc.,

and

There are no requirements

small business case pursuant to Section

102(a)(3) does not depend on the debtor's decision to be treated as a small business under Section

See In re Haskell-Dawes,

also

to represent an

committee ordinarily consists of persons willing

creditors'

may

which grants the courts a significant

committee membership only when

appointment was clearly erroneous.

The unsecured

it

142

deems appropriate

the bankruptcy court has the

policies underlying Section 105 of the Code,

one

at least

1

121(e).

188 B.R. 515 (E.D. Pa 1995).

102(a)(1) (1994).

An Overview for the General Practitioner, 4
10(1991)
145
Cases based on this view adopted either the "arbitrary and capricious standard," e.g., In re First
Republicbank Corp., 95 B.R. 58 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) or the "abuse of discretion standard." See, e.g., In
re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996); In re Value Merchants Inc., 202 B.R. 280
(E.D. Wis. 1996). There are, however, other views maintaining that the court has no power to alter the
committee appointed by the United States Trustee, e.g., In re McLean Industries Inc., 70 B.R. 852 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Victory Markets Inc., 196 B.R.
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995); In re New Life Fellowship
Inc., 202 B.R. 994 (Bankr. W.D. Ok. 1996), and that the court has de novo power to alter a committee's
composition, e.g., In re Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 89 B.R. 1014 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988). See
generally Bruce H. White, A Question of Authority: Can the Bankruptcy Court Alter the Composition of
See Ronald

Utah B.J.

Goss, Chapter] I of the Bankruptcy Code:

8,

1

Creditors' Committees Appointed by the U.S. Trustee?, 16-Aug

Kruger

& Mark A.

PLI/Comm
146
1 1

Speiser et

al.,

Am.

Bankr.

Inst. J.

22 (1997); Lewis

Understanding the Basics of Bankruptcy and Reorganization 1998, 780

863, 865-68 (1998).

U.S.C. Section

1

102(b)(1). Although the

ordinarily consist of those persons

who

Code provides

that the

unsecured creditors' committee shall

are willing to serve and holding the seven largest unsecured claims

for a person or entity to qualify to

sit

on the committee. The person or entity can hold the

unsecured deficiency portion of a secured claim, can be a trade creditor, or can be the
union representative. The committee members are reimbursed for the actual expenses
incurred in connection with their participation on the committee.

considered administrative expenses.

distinct

from

its

members

committee protects the

interests of

the reorganization process.

creditors'

151

150

its

responsibilities

The committee may employ

154

a separate legal entity,
149

The

professionals

entitled to reasonable

subject

is

compensation

as

1

and

rights of the

committee are diverse:
153

to consult with the

to investigate the financial condition

to participate in the plan negotiation;

155

against the debtor, these requirements are not mandatory. Virginia A. Bell

Committees and Their Roles

is

professionals to assist in

The employment of the committee

concerning the administration of the case;

conduct of the DIP;

committee

are

constituents by monitoring the DIP's activities and

and approved professionals are

administrative expenses.

The

The

These expenses

or any specific creditor sitting on the committee.

negotiates a plan with the DIP.

to court approval,

148

147

and

to

& Paul

DIP

and the

perform other

B. Jones, Creditors'

Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 1993 Det. C.L. Rev. 1551 (1993). For the
equity security holders' committee, see 1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 102 (b)(2) (1994).
1 1 U.S.C. Section 503(b)(3)(d). Committee members' expenses are to be reimbursed from the estate
without their having to prove that the individual members substantially contributed to the case. John D.
in

Penn, Controlling the Composition

and Creation of Creditors' Committees, 16-May Am. Bankr.

Inst. L.J.

40,40(1997).
148

149

Id; 11 U.S.C. Section 507(a)(1) (1994).

See In re Saxon Indus.,

3 B.R. 645,
150

Inc., 29 B.R. 320, 321 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1983); In
648 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1980).

1 1

U.S.C. Section

Id.

Section

151

1

1

103(a).

re

Proof of the Pudding,

Inc.,

103 (1994).

The counsel

for the unsecured creditors'

unsecured creditors, not just to the committee members.

committee has a fiduciary relationship

E.g., In re

to all

General Homes Corp., 181 B.R. 870

(S.D. Tex. 1994); In re Barney's Inc., 197 B.R. 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
152
1

1

153

Id.

U.S.C. Sections 330, 503(b)(4), 507(a)(1), and 1103(a) (1994).
Section

creditors'

1

103

(c)(1).

committee

See also In re

could be directly negotiated.)
154
1 1

155

Id.

U.S.C. Section

Jefley, Inc.,

219 B.R.88 (E.D.

to participate in attempted bargaining with the

1

103 (c)(2) (1994).

Section 1103(c)(3).

Pa. 1998) (The court directed the

union so that the creditors' interests

1

32

services in the interest of those represented.

156

Thus,

in theory, the

unsecured creditors'

committee should exert significant influence on the outcome of the reorganization
proceeding by preventing the DEP's indiscretions. In practice, however,
157

influences the proceeding.

In

The committee has

fallen short of

it

rarely

Congress's expectations.

smaller cases, the committee sometimes does not even exist because of the absence of

creditors' concerns.

properly.

159

158

Even

In larger cases,

where a committee

in cases

is

formed,

it

may

not

work

even though the committee has broad powers, the powers are

not always
160

utilized.

Sometimes

the attorney of a

incoming reports about the business,

161

committee actively monitors the case and
thereby in part curbing the DIP's indiscretions.

Criticisms about the unsecured creditors' committee are abundant because of the

substantial cost to the estate

"

and

its

ineffectiveness.

agency costs, and they can be significant
the

committee

is

due

Id.

re

is

members

to be active in

the costs incurred are

prolonged.

The

ineffectiveness of

compensation beyond expenses

committee matters because of the

103 (c)(5); see In re George Worthington Co., 921 F.2d 626, 633 (9
Energy Corp., 35 B.R. 539, 543 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983)).

Section

GHR

the case

to several factors. First, the lack of

discourages the committee

156

if

Most of

1

th

Cir.

1990) (citing In

1

Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter II Reorganizations: Reducing Costs, Improving Results, 73
B.U.L. Rev. 581,614(1993).
158
Karen Gross & Matthew S. Barr, Bankruptcy Solutions in the United States: An Overview, 17 N.Y.L.
Sch. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 215, 232 (1997). Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, in small cases, on
request of a party in interest, the court

U.S.C. Section

1

102

(a)(3)).

A

may

committee (
engaged in commercial

order, for cause, not to appoint a creditors'

"small business"

is

defined by the

Code

as a person

1

whose primary activity is owning or operating real property)
whose aggregate noncontingent liquidated secured and unsecured debts do not exceed $2,000,000 (11

or business activities (other than a person

U.S.C. Section 101 (51C)).
159

Gross

&

Barr, supra note 158, at 232.

160

Id.
161

Lynn M. LoPucki

& George G. Triantis, A

Systems Approach

Reorganization of Financially Distressed Companies, 35 Harv.

to

Comparing

Int'l L.J.

U.S.

and Canadian

267, 306 (1994).

u

considerable time they have to spend.

163

Second, the committee members rarely have the

expertise necessary to perform their expected duties.

have experience with reorganization proceedings;

164

still

necessary to evaluate or investigate a debtor's business

been involved

in

of the committee

DIP.

166

b

of the committee

fewer of them have the
165

members
skills

because few of them

may have

bankruptcy cases. Third, perhaps most importantly, the ineffectiveness

is

caused by the fact that

The unsecured

cannot compel

Few

creditors'

it

cannot directly control the activities of the

committee can influence the DIP's decision making, but

167
it.

Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as
Producer, Director and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion Play, 69 Am. Bankr. L.J. 43
45051 (1995).
"

1

163

Adams, supra note

164

Id.
165

Id.
166

Id.
ibl

Id.

157, at 615.

,

Chapter

III

Roles of the Bankruptcy Courts

According

to the basic

scheme of the Code,

those of a disinterested adjudicator

arisen.

However, because the

who

creditors'

the bankruptcy court's roles are limited to

functions only

when

committee, the counterpart of the DIP, and the

mere existence of the fiduciary duty of the DIP have proved
fair

a legal controversy has

to

be not enough to ensure

and efficient proceedings, the bankruptcy courts' active involvement

has been required to

make

reorganization proceedings

The Code, however, does not provide
efficient.

Because the

practical realities

specific

in the

more expeditious and

ways

for the court to

and necessities involved

in a

process

efficient.

make

168

the process

case vary, a

narrowly defined provision cannot meet such a variety of circumstances. Therefore,
Section 105 of the

Code

grants a comprehensive

demands of cases. The language of
discretion.

168

This view

It is

is

power

to the courts to

meet the various

the section appears to give the courts unlimited

thus said that the bankruptcy court

is

a court of equity.

169

based on the assumption that although the current provisions of Chapter

have not proved successful

in practice, the goals

This does not

1 1

of the Code

underlying those provisions are laudable. There are those

commentators who argue that Chapter 1 should be abolished in its entirety. See Michael Bradley &
Michael Rosenberg, The Untenable Case for Chapter 77,11 Yale L.J. 1043, 1078 (1992); James W.
Bowers, Rehabilitation, Redistribution or Dissipation: The Evidence for Choosing among Bankruptcy
Hypotheses, 72 Wash. U. L. Q. 955, 976-77 (1994). Some others question whether the underlying premises
1

1 1 have been justified. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law,
209-24 (1986); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. Legal Stud. 127

of Chapter

(1986).
169

Note & Comment, A Case for the Use of a Broad Court Equity Power to
Chapter 11 Reorganization, 12 Bankr. Dev. J. 775 (1996); Robert H. George, Note, Bankruptcy

See, e.g., Brian Leepson,

Facilitate

for Nonbankruptcy Purposes: Are There Any Limits?, 6 Rev.

34

Litig.

95 (1987).

35

mean, however,

instead, that the court

embodies a

that

bankruptcy court

that the

is

is

a traditional court of equity.

170
It

means,

"a specialized court of limited jurisdiction applying statutory law

particular, often changing, social objective."

171

Because bankruptcy

reorganization law should meet such changing circumstances, the courts accordingly have

much

discretion in interpreting and applying the law.

court can be referred to as a court of equity, but

its

172

In this sense, the

discretion in interpretation should be

kept within the generally accepted limitations of jurisprudence.

The scope of
example,

the court's

powers

in

bankruptcy

173

making a reorganization case

efficient by, for

nonviable debtors from the relief will thus be defined through the

filtering out

interpretation of the statutory language of the relevant provisions, such as Section 105

and Section

1 1

12 of the Code. In order to discuss the scope of the court's powers,

would be helpful

.

examine the

between the DIP and

Hon. Marcia

L. Rev. 275,

1

"

See

First,

it

background of the court's powers

in

advance.

Separation of Functions

As mentioned above,

170

historical

Evolution of the Courts' Equitable Power

A.

1

to

it

id. at

is

its

S. Krieger,

174

Chapter

1 1

of the Code basically relies on the bargain

creditors for a successful reorganization; this cannot be achieved,

"The Bankruptcy Court

Is

a Court of Equity": What Does That Mean?, 50 S.C.

310(1999).

297

(asserting, in relevant part, that the phrase "court of equity"

and has been used

to define the

is

used

in three different

ways.

scope of the court's jurisdiction and authority. Second, the phrase

has been used to legitimize the social policy underlying bankruptcy law and to justify a conclusion or result

where the

result

is

invoked by parties
173

The

not that of application of statutory law. Third, the powers of an equitable court are

who want

to get a result that

court's discretion in interpretation

is

seems

fair to

them but may not be consistent with

allowed not because the court

is

the law).

a court of equity but because

bankruptcy law concerning reorganization should meet the varieties and changing needs of society.
the

Code's provisions are also comprehensive enough

interpretation. See, e.g.,
174

See Chapter II-B of

1

1

U.S.C. Section 105(a)

this thesis.

to

& (d).

invoke the court's considerable discretion

Many
in

of

36

however, without the bankruptcy court's supervision and intervention. Then the question

becomes

to

what extent the bankruptcy courts should be involved

management. Under the Bankruptcy Act,
involved

in the

case

management and

175

in the

case

bankruptcy courts or judges were actively

in the

ordinary affairs of reorganization cases. In

other words, under the Act, the courts played important roles in performing

administrative, supervisory, and clerical functions in addition to their judicial duties.

The Act required
participation

that the courts

efficiently.

creditors

in the

procedure because creditor

was below congressional expectation and offered

creditors' interests

and

be actively involved

were protected and

This

in part led to the

insufficient guarantee that

that the reorganization case

would proceed

fairly

perception that lawyers and trustees, instead of

and equity owners, controlled bankruptcy cases and

because of their involvement

176

in the debtor's affairs

that

judges were biased

and business. This perception was

grounded upon "the direct involvement of the bankruptcy judges

in the administrative

aspects of bankruptcy cases, selection and appointment of trustees and subsequent

decisions by the judges on legal issues that arose out of or referenced information

obtained by the judges during the administrative processes."
In designing the

Code, Congress recognized the negative impacts of the court on the

credibility of the reorganization procedure.

Congress thus removed a wide range of

administrative matters from the bankruptcy judge.

accordingly, transferred

175

177

many

The 1978 Bankruptcy Code,

of the supervisory functions from the judge to a case

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1938,

Stat.

840 (1938) (repealed

in

1978)

176

Stephen A. Stripp, An Analysis of the Role of the Bankruptcy Judge and the Use of Judicial Time, 23
Seton Hall L. Rev. 1329, 1337(1993).
177

Ericka P. Rogers, United States Trustee System, 2 Nev.

Law

(Mar. 1994),

at 16.

37

and

trustee

to the

dispute has arisen.

forum

that

is

178

United States Trustee.

Under

fair in fact

to take an active role in

the judge only

when

a

Code, therefore, "the bankruptcy court should become a

the

and

The Code involves

in

appearance as well"

managing bankruptcy

1

since the judge no longer

is

obliged

cases. In addition to the creation of the

United States Trustee, the Code prohibits the bankruptcy judges from attending creditors'
meetings.

180

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure

communications between the court and

2.

The Need

1

parties in interest.

in

1978, the principle of separation of

and administrative functions has been eroded continuously because the need for

efficiency in the prosecution of Chapter

1 1

cases has increased. Partly due to creditor

apathy and partly because of the uniform performance
practices by the United States Trustee,

involved

78

179

'

for Efficiency

However, since Congress enacted the Code
judicial

also prohibits ex parte

in the

182

in administrative rules

and

bankruptcy judges have become increasingly

administration of bankruptcy cases

183

Miller, supra note 162, at 434.

House Report, supra note

5

1

,

at 4.

See generally Paul N. Silverstein

& Harold Jones,

The Evolving Role

of Bankruptcy Judges Under the Bankruptcy Code, 51 Brook. L. Rev. 555 (1985). See also In re Gusam
Restaurant Corp., Ill F.2d 274 (2nd Cir. 1984), rev'g 32 Bankr. 832 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (concluding
that

Congress's expressed intent to curtail excessive judicial involvement

in

administrative matters and the

Code's legislative history prohibiting the sua sponte conversion of cases made clear that Section
requirement of a request by a party
180
1

181

182
183

1

should be read

in interest

1 1

12(b)

literally).

U.S.C. Section 341(c) (1994).

Fed. R. Bank. P. 9003.
Miller, supra note 162, at 435.
See, e.g., United Savings Association

Inwood Forest Associates

Ltd.),

v.

Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.
th
(5 Cir. 1987), affd, 484 U.S. 365 (1988).

808 F.2d 363

(In re

Timbers of

38

3.

Amendments

To meet
courts,

to Section

this increased

105

need for active case management on the part of the bankruptcy

Congress amended Section 105 of the Code

1986.

in

intended to authorize the courts to take any action and
to enforce a court order or rule

on a sua sponte basis

reorganization process. Since the effective date

184

The amendment was

make any determination necessary

to prevent abuses of the

of the amendment, the courts have

frequently issued broad sweeping orders to control or

manage a

case.

before the status conferences were codified in Section 105(d) of the

In addition,

Code

in 1994, the

courts often used Bankruptcy Rule 7016, which applies Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of

Under Bankruptcy Rule

Civil Procedure to adversary proceedings in reorganization cases.

7016, the judge could organize and conduct a pretrial conference

in

order

to, for

example,

expedite the case, prevent wasteful pretrial activities, and facilitate the settlement of the

case.

186

In 1994,

Congress again amended Section 105 of the Code,

1

R7

authorizing bankruptcy

judges to hold status conferences sua sponte or on a motion of a party
status conference

parties in interest.

the

Code

can be held

185

any reorganization case or proceeding

At the conferences, unless

it

is

after notice to

inconsistent with another provision of

deems appropriate

to ensure that the case

proceeds expeditiously

Oct. 27, 1986. See Pub.L. 99-554, Title II, Section 203, 100 Stat. 3097.
See generally Manuel D. Leal, The Power of the Bankruptcy Court: Section 105, 29

S.

(1988).
186
187
188

The

or Bankruptcy Rules, the court can issue an order prescribing limitations and

conditions as the judge

184

in

in interest.

See Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub.L. 103-394,
11 U.S.C. Section 105(d) (1994).

Oct. 22, 1994, 108 Stat. 4108.

Tex. L. Rev. 487

1

39

and economically.
debtor must

the debtor

date by

file

189

Such orders include, among

others, setting a date

by which the

a disclosure statement and a reorganization plan; setting a date by which

must assume or

which a party

executory contract or unexpired lease; and setting a

reject an

in interest other than a

debtor

may

file

a plan.

190

By amending

Section 105 of the Code, Congress formally acknowledged that active case administration

by bankruptcy courts often benefits
bankruptcy process.

all

parties

and increases the efficiency of the

191

Scope of the Courts' Equitable Power under Section 105

4.

Even

if

one admits

discretionary

power

power

to "fill the

that Section 105 of the

to the

gaps

left

Code

grants a wide range of equity or

bankruptcy court, the question of whether the court has the

by the statutory language"

still

remains unanswered. For

example, unlike most other courts, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals disallowed the
use of cross-collateralization in Shapiro v.Saybrook Manufacturing Co., Inc.

collateralization alters the general distribution

scheme mandated

reorganization. Despite the lack of express authorization,

cross-collateralization, using the courts' equitable

the rehabilitation of the debtor,

189

Id.
190

Id.

powers

many

in

~

Cross-

bankruptcy

courts have permitted

to effect a result consistent with

which these courts considered

to

be the primary goal of

Section 105(d)(2).

Because the enumerated items of Section 105(d)(2) are not exclusive, the court may order the DIP,
to combine the plan and disclosure statement into one simple and precise document. Such an

for example,

order will contribute to reducing time and

Keeping
191

It

Simple:

A Case

Study, 17-Jan

money

in the

Am Bankr.

reorganization process. See Hon. Leif

Inst. J. 28,

43 (1998).

Miller, supra note 162, at 439.

192

In re

Saybrook Manufacturing

Co., Inc.,

963 F.2d 1490, 1496

th

(1

Cir. 1992).

M.

Clark,

40

Chapter

1

payments
ground

of the Code.

1

193

Another disagreement among the courts

arises regarding

payments on

to pre-petition creditors. Several appellate courts disallow the

such payments will contravene the statutorily established methods of

that

distribution.

194

The

courts denying the bankruptcy court the

power

to

fill

limited to a furtherance of expressly delineated

payments by

utilizing the courts' equitable

the strict statutory mandates.

Code

sections.

195

gap

left

Code

is

the

the statutory language consider that the application of Section 105(a) of the

by

Other courts allow such

powers under Section 105(a)

to

move beyond

196

However, some commentators argue
the gap left

the

that the

bankruptcy courts have the powers to

fill

by the statutory language because Section 105 of the Code grants such

equitable powers to the courts.

197

This opinion emphasizes that "(e]quity developed out of

a recognition of a need for flexibility, a realization that strict reliance on the written law

will lead to unjust

and inefficient

results,

and a belief
i

that special

remedies should be

no

judicially devised in appropriate circumstances."

This opinion may, however, be

confused about the distinction between the nature of bankruptcy law and the bankruptcy
courts' power.

9

See, e.g.,

The Code indeed includes many

Unsecured Creditors' Comm.

V.

First Nat' I

equitable provisions,

Bank

&

199

and, therefore, the

Trust (In re Ellingsen

MacLean

Oil Co.),

th

834 F.2d 599, 603 (6 Cir. 1987); Burchinal v. Central Washington Bank (In re Adams Apple, IncJ, 829
th
F.2d 1484, 1490 (9 Cir. 1987); Borne Chem. Co. v. Lincoln First Commercial Corp. (In re Borne Chem.
Co.), 9 B.R. 263, 269-70 (Bankr.D. N.J. 1984).
1

Chiason

v.

Louis Matherne

& Associates (In

re

Oxford Management,

Inc.),

4 F.3d 1329, 1337 (5

th

Cir.

1993).

.„i£n
Leepson. supra note
169,

195 i
196

See, e.g., In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.,

B.R. 152, 154 (Bankr.
197

.:
i /"„;/:.,.. „„ d„„/,
.„., oi incni
776 /(quoting
2 Collier on Bankruptcy, % 105.01,

„. -i-i£

at

W.D.

Leepson, supra note 169,

198

Id. at
199

E.g.,

„»

at

nc r\A 1(15c* ed.))
105-04
i

1

98 B.R. 174, 179 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1989); In re Gulf Air, 112

La. 1989).
at

807.

777.

automatic stay, the broad definition of the estate, strong-arm powers to marshal assets, avoidance of

liens, sale

of estate assets free and clear of liens or interests, equitable subordination of claims, and coercing

debtors to explain their past financial affairs are

all like

bankruptcy courts. Krieger, supra note 170, at 295.

equitable relief that can be obtained in non-

41

courts can exercise a broad discretionary

provisions to a specific case.

mean
fill

that the

fact that the courts

for

It

utilizing alternative dispute resolution

of the prime examples

that the courts can

is

Code, the bankruptcy courts are increasingly

methods

to

manage bankruptcy cases

the use of the mediation process in Chapter

a non-binding process, in which an independent person

induce rationality

among

in several

is

1 1

effectively.

cases.

201

introduced "to

the parties and avoid expensive, vexatious, and protracted

pursuit of litigation tactics or stalemated negotiations."

been used

means, instead,

ADR

In conjunction with Section 105 of the

is

have discretionary power does not

2

Use of Section 105

Mediation

or applying such

by the statutory language, but they cannot move beyond the expressed

mandates of the Code.

One

in interpreting

bankruptcy courts are courts of equity.

the gaps left

5.

The

power

cases to solve claims disputes.

203

202

Section 105 of the

This section offers

Code has

many

potentials

for the efficient execution of reorganization cases.

200

to

One

of the problems related to the various discretion

among

an empirical study, the perception that case processing varies

the judges

among

is

"forum shopping." According

the bankruptcy judges induces

really means "judge shopping." Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping
An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 Cornell L.
Rev. 967, 1002 (1999). See also Hon. Leif M. Clark & Douglas E. Deutsch, The Delaware Gap: Exposing
New Flaws in the Scheme of Bankruptcy Referrals, 5 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 257 (1997).
201
Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as
Producer, Director, and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion Play, 69 Am. Bankr. L.J. 431, 436

forum shopping, which

for Judges:

(1995).
202

Id.
203

Id. at

438

n.

25.

42

B.

The Courts' Debtor Screening

In order to

204

Role

reduce the costs incurred during reorganization cases,

it is

necessary to

administer a case expeditiously and efficiently. In particular, preventing debtors not

deserving reorganization efforts from coming into the process

is

most important.

90S

Under

the Code, debtors abusing the automatic stay and those without a going concern value

Should such debtors come into the process, they

not deserve reorganization efforts.

must be expelled

do

as early as possible to protect creditors

from unnecessary

costs.

There are several methods developed by theory or expressly provided by the Code
provisions to which the courts can resort to prevent debtors not deserving reorganization

from entering the process, or
agreement

that,

to oust

them.

under the Code, there

is

First,

various courts and commentators are in

an implied good faith requirement in filing a case

even though the Code does not explicitly provide such a requirement.

207

Second,

according to Section 362(d) of the Code, the court can grant relief from the stay to a party
in interest for cause,

such relief

is

including lack of adequate protection of the party in interest.

granted for a creditor, the case often loses

Third, pursuant to Section

1 1

its

If

merit and the process stops.

12(b) of the Code, the court can convert a reorganization

case to Chapter 7 liquidation or dismiss a case for cause

204

208

In this thesis, "debtor screening"

is

if

such conversion or dismissal

used to mean both the effort to select debtors eligible for

reorganization immediately after the filing and the effort to expel debtors without eligibility from the
reorganization process by either dismissing the case or converting
205

it

to a liquidation case.

Debtors not deserving reorganization include those without going concern or economic viability and

whose management is abusing the process in order to thwart the creditors.
However, if a debtor is viable despite the management of the debtor being incompetent or dishonest,
such a debtor can be reorganized. In such a case, the DIP should be replaced with a trustee, and the case
those
206

should not be dismissed.
207

Carlos

J.

Cuevas,

Good

Faith

and Chapter

11: Standard That Should

Faith Chapter 11 Cases, 60 Tenn. L. Rev. 525, 525 (1993).
208

11

U.S.C. Section 362(d) (1994).

Be Employed

to

Dismiss

Bad

is

43

of creditors.

in the best interest

dismiss a case or suspend

all

209

Fourth, the court

proceedings

if

may

the court

apply Section 305 of the Code to

deems

that

such dismissal or

suspension would better serve the interests of creditors and the debtor.

Code has

Section 305 of the

provision of the

Code

rarely

make any determination necessary
relationships

The dismissal of

Code

Section

1 1

among

211

12(b), while

courts' integrity

212

to screen or expel

some kinds of debtors

the various debtor screening

at the

is

is

rarely used because such dismissal cannot be

Section 105 has been used by several courts in conjunction with

some

courts have used Section 105 as a ground for protecting the

when dismissing

a case with prejudice. Further, Section

1

1 1

faith filing.

that the implied threshold requirement, unlike Section

1 1

12(b),

is

one of the indications

12(b) of the Code. In other words, "bad faith"

is

12(b)

is

The

is

preliminary stages of a reorganization case. According to this view, bad

counterpart of good faith,

1

any action or

to take

methods are rather complicated.

used as a ground for recognizing the implied requirement of good
difference

explicit

or appropriate to prevent an abuse of process.

a case under Section 305

reviewed by appeal.

no

is

can be utilized under certain circumstances, the court

that

from the process. Section 105 expressly gives the court the authority

The

However,

been used to dismiss a case. Where there

to Section 105 of the

sometimes resorts

210

applicable

faith, the

that constitutes the "cause" of Section

a version of the cause on the side of

the debtor.

209

Id.

Section 1112(b).

A/.

Section 305(A).

210
211

Luis F. Chaves, In

Rem Bankruptcy

Mortgages? 24 Cal. Bankr.

J. 3,

Refiling Bars: Will They Stop

14 (1998).

Abuse of the Automatic Stay Against

1

44

1

Good

.

Faith Filing Requirement

Unlike the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,

213

Chapter

require that a reorganization case be filed in

good

been adopted among the courts.

faith test has

214

1

1

Code does

of the

faith.

not explicitly

However, the threshold good

With respect

to the

meaning of "good

faith," various courts are in

disagreement. The divergent opinions about the question of

what constitutes good

stem from the different views about the goals and policies of

faith

reorganization law.

Some

courts' decisions focus exclusively

indication of

good
good

irrelevant to

faith.

Under

216

faith.

on the debtor's

motive for

this test, the debtor's

This view, the objective

ability to reorganize

test, asserts that

subjective test relies on the debtor's speculative inner motive,

exercise too

much

test is consistent

filing for

it

is

17

The

The bankruptcy crimes

The weakness of

this test is that

Tamara Ogier

is

it

an

bankruptcy court by

statute is also designed to ensure the integrity of the

criminalizing intentional and fraudulent abuse of the process.

objective

to provide a

ignores the importance of the subjective purpose or intent of the DIP, which

~

is

1 1

allows the court to

with the purpose of business reorganization, which
218

Chapter

as an

because the

discretion in determining whether to dismiss a case.'

vehicle for the rehabilitation of a distressed business.

215

& Jack F. Williams,

Bankruptcy Crimes and Bankruptcy Practice, 6 Am. Bankr.
213
214

Inst. L. Rev. 317, 329 (1998).
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1898. It governed all bankruptcy cases filed prior to October 1, 1979.
See, e.g., In re Cohoes Indus. Terminal, 931 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1991); Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d

693

th

(4

Cir. 1989);

F.2d 1393

Phoenix Piccadilly,

th

Cir. 1988); Little

(1

Ltd.

v.

Life Insurance Co. (In re

Creek Development Corp.

v.

Phoenix Piccadilly,

Commonwealth Mortgage

Ltd.),

849

Co. (In re Little

th

Creek Dev. Co.), 779 F.2d 1068 (5 Cir. 1986).
215
The objective test is premised upon the notion
reorganizing. See,

e.g.,

Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d
513, 527 (1984). If

it

that a debtor

must have a

realistic possibility

of

In re Ionosphere Clubs, 98 B.R. 174, 177-78 (Bankr. S.D.N. Y. 1989); In re

is

1

136,

evident from the

1

137 (6

th

Cir. 1985); N.L.R.B. V. Bidisco

commencement of a

& Bildisco,

case that reorganization

is

courts will find objective bad faith. If so, courts probably will find subjective bad faith, too,

reason that the case was filed was to thwart the creditors. Cf. Carolin Corp.

v.

Miller,

465 U.S.

unlikely, then
if

the only

886 F.2d 693

th

(4

1989)
216

Eugene

Conn.

J.

DiDonato,

L. Rev.

Good

1,26-27(1983).

Faith Reorganization Petitions: The Back

Door

Lets the Stranger In, 16

Cir.

1

1

45

important concept in commercial law.

commercial law because

committed

defaults.

to reorganize

1

1

and

only to evade

is

it

In a sense, reorganization

mechanism created

a

Moreover, subjective good

will treat

its

219

its

creditors with

The

is

to deal with a debtor

faith,

and

that

objective test

it

an extension of

who

DIP

faith insures that the

good

220

obligation to creditors.

law

has

honestly intends

will not use

Chapter

insufficient in that

is

it

ignores the debtor's motive.

In contrast, the subjective test regards the

In order to receive equity, the debtor

of motive.

under

2" 1

The

this test,

must have clean hands. This

viability of the debtor

once subjective bad

bankruptcy system as an equitable process.

is

test

looks for evidence

immaterial to keep the case proceeding. Thus,

faith is established

by showing

that the debtor has

attempted to use the bankruptcy process to thwart the creditors' rights, the case should be

dismissed despite the prospect of a successful reorganization.
Piccadilly, Ltd., the United States Court of

222

In In re

Phoenix

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held

that "the

prospects of a successful reorganization do not override, as a matter of law, the finding of

bad

faith

.

.

.

This view, however, also has some flaws. This

."

the policy of the

Code

that intends to provide

Moreover, debtor rehabilitation

2.7
2.8

is

open access

test in part contradicts

to distressed businesses.

one of the goals of Chapter

1 1

and

is at

least as

Id. at 26.

See In re Coastal Cable

T.V., Inc.,

st

709 F.2d 762,765

Cir. 1983).

(1

219

U.C.C. Section 1-203 (1990) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good
faith in its performance or enforcement."). For the definition of good faith, see U.C.C. Sections 1-201, 2103.

220

In re

HBA

East, Inc., 87 B.R. 248,

57 B.R. 215, 218 (Bankr. M.D.
221

See Michael

J.

258-59 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1988); In re Southern Communities,

Inc.,

Fla. 1986).

Venditto, The Implied Requirement of

"Good Faith"

Filing:

Where Are

the Limits of Bad

Faith?, 1993 Det. C.L. Rev. 1591, 1598 (1993).
222

Phoenix Piccadilly,
th

(1

Cir. 1988); In re

Ltd.

v.

Life Insurance Co. {In re

Denver Inv.

Phoenix Piccadilly,

138 B.R. 307, 310 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991).
223

In re

Phoenix Piccadilly,

Ltd.,

Ltd.),

849 F.2d 1393, 1395

Co., 141 B.R. 228, 231 (Bankr. N.D. Fla 1992); In re Club

849 F.2d 1393, 1394

th

(1

Cir. 1988).

Tower L.P.,

46

important as creditor protection. In addition, the subjective

to the

language of Code section

unable to reorganize.

There

is

1

1

12(b),

seems

to

be contrary

which protects creditors against a debtor who

dismiss a case. In Carolin Corp.

v.

Miller?

25

extraordinary remedy,

it

futility

and subjective bad

the United States Court of

Fourth Circuit noted that because dismissal of a case

at a

preliminary stage was an

The

should be exercised only "with great care and caution.'"

that, therefore,

"something more than even the most obvious
"2
.

.

.

Circuit concluded that "both objective futility and subjective bad faith should

be shown in order to warrant dismissals for want of good faith
Circuit Court rationalized this high standard by stating that

subjective bad faith, the ultimate futility issue

development.
original

faith to

Appeals for the

likelihood of ultimate futility should be required to justify threshold dismissals

The Fourth

is

224

another view that requires both objective

Fourth Circuit stated

test also

229

Conversely,

if

is

if

8

in filing."*

there

is

The Fourth

no question of

better left to post-petition

the reorganization

is

not objectively

motive or intent should not warrant dismissal.

230

This view

futile, the

is

debtor's

based on a

presumption that the implied threshold requirement should be different from the
requirements of Section

1

1

12(b) because there

is

a risk of premature dismissal of viable

cases in the preliminary dismissal. However, there

treatment, and

224

it

would be

is

no justification for such different

a pure waste of resources to attempt to reorganize an

th

Cir. 1986); In re Fossum, 764 F.2d 520, 521-22 (8*
Absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation is one of the "causes" provided by Section
11 12(b) of the Code. 11 U.S.C. Section
1 12(b)(1) (1994).
th
225
Carolin Corp. v. Miller (In re Carolin Corp.), 886 F.2d 693 (4 Cir. 1989).

See, e.g.. In re Koerner,

800 F.2d 1358, 1368

Cir. 1985).

1

226

Id. at

700.

227

Id.
228

229

Id. at

700-701.

Id. at

701.

(5

47

absolutely nonviable debtor even

case

is

if

the case has been filed in subjective

destined to be dismissed by the application of Section

would be

better to dismiss the case earlier before

standard of this view

is

1

1

1

good

faith. If the

2(b) of the Code,

it

incurs costs hurting the creditors.

it

too rigid to apply under the

Code

in that this

view makes

The

it

difficult for dismissal to occur.

Courts employing the

totality

of the circumstances

test

view the good

faith

requirement as an important instrument for maintaining the integrity of the bankruptcy
system.

using

232

Under

some

test is often

this test, a court

Code

good

all

the facts

and circumstances of the case,

factors to determine whether the petition has been filed in

used

to dismiss single asset real estate cases.

Creek Development Co.~
for

examines

section 362(d),

faith standard

234

the Fifth Circuit discussed the

236

but also for

Code

section

performed an important role

in

1 1

good

For example,

good

12(b).

faith

237

233

faith.

This

in In re Little

requirement not only

The court noted

that the

preventing a debtor from abusing the

i0

Id.
]
231

While

insisting that the objective-subjective test

Miller, supra note 225,
to survive a

is

adopted by the Fourth Circuit Court

in

Carolin Corp.

v.

good faith test, one commentator argues that in order for a debtor
debtor must demonstrate both that it can reorganize and that the case

the preferable

motion for dismissal, the

faith. Carlos J. Cuevas, Good Faith and Chapter 11: Standard That
Should be Employed to Dismiss Bad Faith Chapter 11 Cases, 60 Tenn. Rev. 525, 530 (1993). However, the
test adopted in Carolin requires that the movant demonstrate both objective and subjective bad faith in

has not been filed in subjective bad

order to dismiss the case. Therefore, according to Carolin,

the reorganization

is

not objectively

debtor's subjective original intent does not warrant dismissal. Carolin 886 F.2d

at

701. In contrast, under

the

commentator's view,

the reorganization
232

is

if

if

futile, the

a case has been filed in subjective bad faith, the case should be dismissed even

if

not objectively futile.

In re Ravick Corp., 106 B.R. 834,

843 (Bankr. D. N.J 1989). In

re

HBA

East, 87 B.R. 248, 258 (Bankr.

E.D. N.Y. 1988).
233

1

In re Village

Green Realty

Trust, 113 B.R. 105,

1

15-16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990); In re Sherwood Enters.,

12 B.R.165,168 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989).

234

See In re McCormick Rd. Assocs., 127 B.R. 410 (Bankr. N.D.

111.

1991); In re Castleton Assocs., 109

B.R. 347 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1989); In re Northwest Place Ltd., 108 B.R. 809 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988).
235

7?9 F

236
1

1

2(j

106g (5

th

Cir 19g6)

U.S.C. Section 362(d) (1994). Section 362(d)(1) permits a creditor to seek relief from the automatic

stay for cause,

and courts have held

that

bad

362(d)(1).
237

Little Creek,

supra note 214,

at

1071-74.

faith constitutes

cause for relief from the stay. See

id.

1

48

reorganization process and in protecting the integrity of the bankruptcy system/

stated that to determine

whether a case had been

filed in

good

faith required

also

It

an evaluation

of the totality of the circumstances, including the debtor's financial condition, motives

and the local financial

239

realities.

adjustable to any circumstances.

This view

240
It

is

Code because

appropriate under the

can also take into consideration the goals and

policies underlying the bankruptcy law. Nevertheless, this

view has been

criticized for

relying on particular, predetermined factors for determining bad faith and because

usually been applied in single asset debtor cases.

circumstances

exclusive.

242

test

it is

241

its

has

it

Indeed, the totality of the

has been developed from single asset cases, but use of the

Moreover, even though findings of lack of good

faith in

test is

not

proceedings have

been predicated on certain recurring patterns, the patterns are only the results of case
analysis and are not exclusive.

238

Id. at

4

1072

239

Id.
240

This view

is

a dynamic one because the meaning of "totality of circumstances"

is

so flexible that

it

can

take into consideration varied and ever-changing social circumstances regarding bankruptcy policies. In this

good faith filing requirement is not a fixed institution that concerns itself with the need
mechanism to abort obviously futile cases straightaway, but it is rather a dynamic device
founded on the desirability of forestalling filings aimed at achieving an objective beyond the accepted
purposes of the bankruptcy process. See Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good

sense, the implied
for a procedural

Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85

Nw. U.

L. Rev. 919,

946-47

(1991).
241

Carlos J. Cuevas, Good Faith and Chapter 11: Standard That Should be Employed to Dismiss Bad Faith
Chapter 11 Cases, 60 Tenn. Rev. 525, 537 (1993).
242
For example, in In re Sharon Steel Corporation, 871 F.2d 1217 (3rd Cir. 1989), the United States Court

of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that "[u]nder the discretionary determination of cause required by
U.S.C. Section
in
243

1

104(a)(1) and the flexible standard embodied in (a)(2), the court acted within

concluding that the

See

Little

totality

of the circumstances signaled the need for a trustee."

Creek, supra note 214,

at

535

n.

70.

Id. at

1228.

its

1

discretion

49

2.

Relief from the Stay

In a voluntary reorganization case, a debtor triggers the

of a bankruptcy petition.

244

The automatic

stay functions as a stay against a variety of acts

affecting the debtor and the property of the estate.

afforded by the automatic stay,

automatic stay upon the filing

some debtors tend

245

to

Because of the conveniences
abuse

it.

If

a debtor files a petition

solely to trigger the automatic stay, for example, the debtor without intention of

reorganization achieves

may be dismissed by
relief

from the

its

principal purpose simply by obtaining the stay. Later the case

may be

the court for such abuse or

terminated by granting a creditor

However, once the process proceeds,

stay.

it

incurs cost. Abusive filings

waste significant resources. Not only the debtor's creditors but also the entire bankruptcy
system, such as the courts, trustees, and other creditors, shares the cost.

Thus, Section 362(d) of the Code provides that on request of a party
court

may

grant relief from the stay.

246

The

relief includes termination,

modification of the stay, and conditioning on the stay.
creditor such relief

for cause,

from the stay

which includes the

adequately protected.

M
1 1

245

248

247

when

there

is

moving

its

collateral is not

in the collateral

U.S.C. Section 362(a) (1994).

H. Rep. No. 95-595, 1978 U.S.

his creditors.

Code Cong.

& Admin.

News

6296-97. ("The automatic stay

It

stops

all

collection efforts,

all

harassment, and

all

It

is

one of the

gives the debtor a breathing spell from

foreclosure actions.

It

permits the debtor

attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove

him

into bankruptcy.").

246
1 1

U.S.C. Section 362(d).

247

Id.
24

grant a

can be granted to the creditor

an "equity cushion"

fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws.

to

it

fact that the creditor's interest in

Therefore,

annulment, or

The court may

in three situations. First,

in interest, the

*Id. Section 362(d)(1).

50

providing sufficient protection to the creditor, relief will be denied.

whether

to grant relief

would

from stay were denied

sustain

if

250

When

more than

is

the

damage

the relief were granted, the court will

effective reorganization,

relief

creditor

the relief will be granted.

whose claim

from the stay

filed a plan that

252

the debtor

the stay."

lift

if,

and, in

249

relief

some

See In re Chauncey

St.

20%

or

re Kost,

in

255
it

the

not necessary to an

relief, the

in

may be

granted

debtor has not either

a reasonable time or

method of creditor

254

protection,

plays a debtor screening role by

is

considered adequate, but less than

1

1%

is

considered inadequate. See In

102 B.R. 829, 830-31 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1989). See generally Gerald

and

the Use, Sale or Lease of Property,

F. Munitz, Adequate
796 PLI/Comm 231(1 999).

Therefore, according to this balancing approach, the equity cushion can be considered as only one factor

determining whether to grant relief from the automatic

Analysis
251

if

Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 107 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989). Usually, an

more

Protection, the Automatic Stay,
250

in part as a

cases, such as single asset real estate,

equity cushion of

Second,

a market rate of interest to each such creditor.

from automatic stay functions

if

Third, in single asset cases, a

has a reasonable possibility of being confirmed

at

is

suffer

and other creditors

in the real estate

within 90 days from the order for

commenced monthly payments
The

253

secured by an interest

is

would

the prejudice the creditor

debtor does not have any equity in the collateral and the collateral

moving

deciding

In

from the stay for "cause" other than lack of adequate protection,

the courts apply a balancing approach.

the relief

249

in

Bankruptcy, 10 Hofstra L. Rev.

See In re Continental Airlines,

that

would be suffered

if

the stay

149,

1

stay.

Lawrence

J.

Dash, The Equity Cushion

191 (1982).

152 B.R. 420, 424 (Bankr. D. Del. 1993) (balancing the prejudice

Inc.,

were

1

lifted, the relative

hardship of the parties, and the probable success of

debtor rehabilitation).
52

For the meaning of "necessary

the "Feasibility" Test

to an effective reorganization," see Daniel A.

O'Connor, Application of

Under Section 362(d)(2): Did Timbers Really Change Anything?, 9 Bankr. Dev.

J.

133(1992).
253
1 1

U.S.C. Section 362(d)(2). See,

e.g.,

In re

Canal Place

Ltd.,

Partnership, 921 F.2d 569 (5

th

Cir.

1991).
254
1

1

U.S.C. Section 362(d)(3). For the definition of the "single asset real estate," see

1

1

U.S.C. Section

101(51B).
255

An analysis based upon 510 chapter
56% to 64% of the cases were filed

that
Hill

Fenning

& Craig A.

Hart,

Rev. 119, 120-22(1996).

1 1

cases during the early 1990s in Los Angeles, California, shows

primarily to protect real property from impending foreclosure. Lisa

Measuring Chapter 11: The Real World of 500 Cases, 4 Am. Bankr.

Inst. L.

51

leading the case to termination, dismissal or conversion.

estate, for

example,

if

a secured creditor

is

256

In a case of single asset real

granted relief from the stay and can continue

the foreclosure, the debtor will lose the merit of the case

and

will

be ousted from the

process.

However, these remedies
dismissal or stay relief, can

convey

prejudice, can

Then

all

are easily circumvented

commence

a

new

in the

case of a

case, or in the case of dismissal with

or a portion of the legal

the different person can, in turn, file a

by debtors. Debtors,

new

title

case.

of their assets to another person.

The debtor of the new case

automatically obtains the protection of the stay. Recognizing the limitations of the

remedies provided by the Code, various courts have developed "prospective relief or

rem orders

to prevent future abuse."

These orders grant the creditor

and prospectively prohibit any parties from using the automatic
future repeat filings, the Bankruptcy

amendment

to the

Code

Review commission has

to authorize the courts "to issue in

relief

stay."

in

from the stay

With respect

to

recently proposed an

rem orders

that

would bar

the

application of a future automatic stay to identified property of the estate for a period up to

six years

when

a party could

show

that the debtor

avoid credit foreclosure or eviction."

256

George G.

Triantis,

Screens, Gatekeepers,
57

Luis F. Chaves, In

Mortgages? 24

had transferred such

259

The Interplay Between Liquidation and Reorganization

and

Guillotines, 16 Int'l Rev. L.

Rem Bankruptcy

Cal. Bankr.

J. 3,

real property ... to

& Econ.

in

Bankruptcy: The Role of

101, 111 (1996).

Refding Bars: Will They Stop Abuse of the Automatic Stay Against

5-6 (1998).

258

Id. at 6.
259

National Bankruptcy Review Commission Final Report,

Rem

Consumer Bankruptcy Proposal No.

Orders, at 281-87 (Oct. 1997). For pending bankruptcy legislation about in rem

relief,

1.

5. 6., In

see H.R. 3150

52

3.

Dismissal or Conversion under Section

1

12(b)

1

The bankruptcy court may convert a reorganization case
dismiss a case for "cause."

260

Section

1 1

12(b) of the

to a

Chapter 7 case or

Code enumerates

ten grounds for

such conversion or dismissal. The listed ten grounds are not exclusive. They are only

examples of the "cause." The Code, however, does not provide a definition of the term
"cause." According to the doctrine developed by case law soon after Congress enacted the

Code, lack of good

bad

faith, that is,

bad

faith.

The

faith

faith,

lists in

debtor. Consequently,

on the part of the debtor constitutes the "cause."

means

Section

it

that the reorganization case

1 1

has been said that "good faith ...

The problem with Section
is

lift

the stay.

12(b)

is

is

1 1

an implicit prerequisite to

of the Code."

that this section's debtor screening role arises

therefore inefficient. For example, the creditors entitled to raise the

issue both under Section

to

1 1

or filed in subjective

12(b) also involve both the futility and bad faith of the

the filing or continuation of a proceeding under Chapter

too late and

is futile

Lack of good

1 1

same

12(b) and 362(d) usually prefer to raise the issue by a motion

The law governing

a motion to

lift

the stay favors an early determination

of the reorganizability of the debtor, while a motion to dismiss or convert a case

discourages an early determination.

&

Mary Davies

Scott,

Pending Bankruptcy Legislation: More

to

Follow??,

SC 78 ALI-ABA

415, 420

(1998) (The National Bankruptcy Conference Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 3150).
260
261

262
263

11U.S.C. Section
See, e.g., Sezter

v.

1 1

12(b) (1994).

Hot Prods.

(In re Sezter),

In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 B.R. 549,

47 B.R. 340, 344 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1985).

558 (Bankr.

CD.

Cal. 1981).

In order to constitute grounds for dismissal or conversion under Section

1 1

12(b)(1), for example, the

must be "continuing," and the delay must be "unreasonable." In addition, the provision requiring
"denial or confirmation of every proposed plan and denial of a request made for additional time for filing
loss

another plan or a modification of a plan," Bankruptcy
will

Code Section

be given every opportunity to reorganize before the case

is

1 1

12(b)(5), suggests that the debtor

dismissed or converted.

53

4.

Dismissal Pursuant to Section 105

Several bankruptcy courts have used their equitable

Code

to dismiss a case with prejudice in order to prohibit

within a specified period of time.

courts' integrity

Code

that

264

Some

appear to

large, Section

Section 362(d)

commencement of a new

courts have used this

power

case

to protect the

by dismissing a case with prejudice, overriding other sections of the
set limits

on the effect of dismissal.

using Section 105 have used Section

5.

power under Section 105 of the

1 1

Courts dismissing a case by

12(b) in conjunction with that section.

By and

105 has been used as a supplemental authority to other provisions such as
267

and

1 1

12(b) of the Code.

268

Timing of Screening

Screening or filtering of debtors should occur as early as possible

in the

reorganization process to reduce costs and save time. However, in reality,

it

takes place at

any time throughout the reorganization process before the court confirms the plan. As a
result,

most cases

that will fail in the

end continue the costly procedure for a long time.

Moreover, the courts are "extremely hesitant

to either terminate the reorganization

attempt or permit creditors to remove significant assets from the debtor."

269

In

most

cases, the courts protect the debtor's exclusive right to file a plan for at least 120 days

2M
265

In re Earl,

140 B.R. 728, 741 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1992).

Chaves, supra note 257,

at 9.

266

Id. at 10.
267

See, e.g., In re Geller,

96 B.R. 564 (E.D.

Pa. 1989) (The court

putting a limitation on future filings altogether for 6

awarded sanctions

months and requiring

for abusive filings,

the court's permission for a

future filing for 2 years).
268

Section 105 of the

Code has been used

to

invoke the court's equitable powers to allow limited payments

of pre-pefition debt under the "doctrine of necessity." Donald S. Bernstein
Introduction to Chapter 11,511

PLI/Comm

7,

34 (1991).

&

Regina E. Shannahan, An

54

commencement of the

after the

period

270

case.

courts have routinely extended the exclusivity

without placing a considerable burden on the debtor to show that the business

has a going concern worth saving.

to

The

271

The average time spent on Chapter

1 1

cases appears

be between 18 and 21 months, and fewer than a third of the plans are confirmed within

a year.

272

Comparison with the Bankruptcy Law of Canada

C.

This problem of inefficiency

arises

in

screening debtors not deserving reorganization efforts

because of the courts' attitude toward the reorganization rather than from the

provisions of the Code. For example, the implied threshold requirement of good faith

filing

and Section

1 1

12(b) and 105 of the

Code provide

the courts a

wide range of

discretion. If the courts appropriately exercise their discretion granted

by the Code,

debtors not eligible for reorganization will be filtered out from the process in time. In this

regard,

Canadian bankruptcy law

and

its

practices provide important insights on the

reorganization system and practices of the United States. For example, the debtor

screening mechanisms of Canadian law suggest an important solution to the prosecution

of Chapter

69

George G.

1

1

of the Code.

Triantis,

270
1

271

1

U.S.C. Section

Triantis,

272

Id.;

The Interplay Between Liquidation and Reorganization

and

Screens, Gatekeepers,
1

Guillotines, 16 Int'l Rev. of L.

& Econ.

in

Bankruptcy: The Role of

101, 103 (1996).

121(d) (1994).

supra note 269,

at 103.

Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter

II,

Wis. L. Rev. 729, 732-39 (1993).

55

1

Threshold Screening

.

The Canadian system examines
early stage of the process.

Canada,

show

274

that

time of

in order for the

it is

filing.

Under

the debtor's eligibility for reorganization at the very

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) of

the

debtor to have the opportunity to reorganize, the debtor must

viable or otherwise eligible for reorganization immediately after or at the

The court holds an ex parte hearing upon

filing

and makes a preliminary

determination on the debtor's eligibility for reorganization, including viability. If the

debtor

is

recognized to be eligible for rehabilitation, the court enters an order granting the

application and staying the collection activity of the creditors.

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA)
as

is

much more common, by

notice of the filing

is

275

may be

A case under the

by the

initiated

the filing of a notice of intention to

make

sent to creditors within five days. Creditors then

terminate the case on the grounds that the debtor

is

of a proposal,

filing

a proposal.

may move

or,

276

The

to

not eligible for reorganization.

277

The

grounds can be abuse of the stay or non-viability of the debtor. In addition, under the

BIA, the debtor must

retain a licensed trustee,

who

has a continuing obligation during the

case to report on the financial condition and prospects of the debtor.

278

If there is

no

possibility of successful reorganization, the trustee will probably refuse to be hired.

trustee's refusal also functions as a

273

Canada has two

means of debtor

screening. After the notice of

statutory regimes for the formal reorganization of insolvent companies: the

Creditors Arrangement Act

(CCAA) and

the

The

Companies'

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA).

R.S.C. ch. C-25 (1985) (Can.) [hereinafter

CCAA]. The

CCAA is

of larger debtors with complicated capital structures, while the

BIA

used primarily for the reorganization

is

a less expensive alternative for

smaller debtors with less complicated capital structures.
275

R.S.C,

ch.

B-3 (1985) (Can.), amended by

ch. 27,

1992 S.C. (Can.), which came into force on Nov. 30,

1992) [hereinafter BIA].
276
77

Jacob

S. Ziegel,

Law Reform, 70 Am. Bankr. L.J. 383, 392 (1996).
A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and Canadian

Canada's Phased-in Bankruptcy

Lynn M. LoPucki

& George G.

Triantis,

Reorganization of Financially Distressed Companies, 35 Harv.

Int'l L.J.

267, 285 (1994).

56

proposal, the debtor must

file

a projected cash flow statement together with the trustee's

report certifying the reasonableness of that statement.

2.

279

Information Disclosure

Under both

the

CCAA and BIA, because of the threshold screening mechanism

mentioned above, not only the court but also the

creditors, at the inception of the case,

can get needed information about the financial and economic conditions of the debtor.

The information helps

the court and creditors correctly evaluate the debtor's business. In

addition, the creditors can use such relatively credible information

On

negotiation.

provide early

to

the other hand, the debtor's

281

during the

management consequently has

in the reorganization stage as

much

the incentive

credible information about

its

business as possible, including the information that has caused the financial distress.

This early-acquired information plays another role in successful reorganization

It

28

in

282

Canada.

subsequently improves the efficiency of a liquidation auction by removing the

advantages the managers

company.

may have and

reducing uncertainty over the value of the

283

278

m
280

Id.
ld.

Under

the

Code, the creditors usually obtain the financial information of the debtor through the

disclosure statement submitted by the DIP. For the debtor's strategies regarding the disclosure statement,

see Glenn

W.

Merrick, The Chapter 11 Disclosure Statement

in

a Strategic Environment, 44 Business

Lawyer 103(1988).
281

By

contrast, in the United States system the financial information prepared

by the DIP for creditors

frequently unreliable. Scott Peltz, Financial Information-Sticking to the Basics, 13-Nov
15,
282

15(1994).
Triantis,

supra note 269,

at 111.

Am.

Bankr.

is

Inst. J.

57

Termination of a Case

3.

The Canadian bankruptcy
case. In both the

courts are

more

flexible

is

in

terminating a pending

United States and Canadian regimes, there are debtor monitoring

systems that often lead a pending case to termination.
the case

and active

Once

may

inappropriate for reorganization, the court

the court has noticed that

terminate the formal

The laws of both

reorganization efforts or convert the case to a liquidation proceeding.

same four

countries focus on the

(2)

whether the case

is

capacity to reorganize;

creditors.

289

factors: (1)

whether the debtor

proceeding quickly enough;
288

and

(4)

287

whether the debtor's act

In both countries, the bankruptcy courts

determining both

how

to

(3)

combine such

is

acting in

good

28

faith;

whether the debtor has the
in

question

is

prejudicial to

have considerable discretion

in

factors to terminate the reorganization effort

what kinds of circumstances warrant such termination. Despite such

and

similarities of factors

leading to termination of a case, there appear to be substantial differences in the judicial

attitudes of both countries.

Unlike the Code, the Canadian system routinely brings cases

before the court for evaluation and possible termination even without a formal

the part of the creditors.

290

Under

specifies the time, typically a

the

CCAA,

move on

for example, the court's initial order

few months, within which the debtor must propose a

283

Id.
284

LoPucki

285

& Triantis, supra

note 277, at 31

1.

BAI Section 50.4(1 1) (Can.).
286
E.g.,
U.S.C. Section 1 12(b); BIA Section 50.4(9) and (1 1) (Can.)
287
E.g.
U.S.C. Section
12(b)(3). Under the BIA (Can.), lack of "good faith" or "due diligence" are
grounds for refusing to extend the time for filing a proposal, BIA Section50.4(9), or for terminating the time
for filing a proposal, BIA Section 50.4(1 1).
288
U.S.C. Section 1 12(b)(1), (2), (4), (5), and (7); BIA Section 50.4(9), (11) (Can).
E.g.
289
12(b)(1), (3); BIA Section 50.4(1 1) (Can).
E.g. 11 U.S.C. Section
1 1

U.S.C. Section
1

12(b) (1994);
1

1

1 1

1

1 1

1 1

1

1

1

290

LoPucki

1

& Triantis, supra

note 277, at 314.
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plan."

The automatic

beyond

that period, the debtor

stay

is

given for only that period."

must present a plan or apply

intervals not longer than forty-five days.

the

the four factors described above.

Id.
292

Id.
29i

While considering

CCAA court can check the debtor's eligibility

291

Id

"

293

again.

To

continue

in

reorganization

to the court for extensions at

the application for extension,

The bases

for the extension are

Chapter IV
Trustee and Examiner

The Need

A.

When

for a Trustee or an

Examiner

X

Congress consolidated Chapter

(Corporate Reorganization), Chapter XI

(Arrangements), and Chapter XII (Real Property Arrangements) of the Bankruptcy Act
(Act)

294

into a unified reorganization chapter of the

Code,

295
it

presumed

that pre-

bankruptcy management would continue to operate the business following the
relief.

filing for

Congress then also recognized the need for displacing the dishonest or grossly

incompetent DIP by creating a mechanism by which interested parties could seek the

appointment of a

trustee.

296
If,

as

is

often the case, the managers of a debtor are so

untrustworthy that the reorganization case

management. On

oust the managers from the

proper because the debtor
instances in

is

itself is

unlikely to succeed,

this occasion, the

economically viable.

which the current management needs

On

it

would be desirable

to

appointment of a trustee

the other hand, there are

to be retained

is

some

even though some

activities

of the management are problematic. For these occasions, the appointment of an

examiner

is

If

provided by the Code.

a trustee

is

appointed,

of the Code. First,

294

when

it

can often solve problems associated with the DIP construct

the debtor has engaged in fraud or has incompetently

The Bankruptcy Act of 1898,

ch. 541,

30

Stat.

managed

544, amended by the Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52

(1938) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-598, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 92
295
Chapter 1 of the Code, Pub. L. No. 95-598.
1

59

Stat.

2549).

Stat.

840

60

the business, for example, a trustee can honestly

and effectively investigate the prior

managers' conduct and can take over the management of the business."

when

may

the debtor does not have such problems, a trustee

management and

tensions between the current

creditors.

298

Second, even

be able to soothe the possible

Third, a trustee also can

more

convincingly resolve issues regarding the corporate governance and the fiduciary duty of
the DIP, because the trustee

is

not elected by the shareholders and has no special relations

with the various constituencies.

the fact that a trustee

is

299

The

benefits of the appointment of a trustee result

an independent third party

who

from

relatively familiar with

is

reorganization cases.

The appointment of an examiner
can help

in

determining early

in a

is

also beneficial in

case whether there

debtor can emerge from the financial difficulties.

may have more

credibility than an investigation

interest in the conclusions

benefits available

much

97

11,

See

11

U.S.C. Section

1

An examiner

by performing

An examiner

by a committee, which likely has an

An examiner may

provide other

third party without incurring as

also can help diffuse possible tensions

its

298

Id.
299

Id.

907,'

among

tasks independently.

104(a) (1994).

Barry L. Zaretsky, Symposium on Bankruptcy: Chapter 11 Issues: Trustees and Examiners

44 S.C. L.Rev.

that the

independent, impartial examination

reached after the investigation.

cost as a trustee does.

instances.

any meaningful chance

from the intervention of an independent

the various constituencies

296

An

is

some

933 (1993).

in

Chapter

1

61

Appointment of a Trustee or an Examiner

B.

The United

States Trustee and any party in interest

appointment of a trustee or an examiner
before the confirmation of a plan.

300

at

If the

any time

may

request the court to order the

after the

commencement of a

case but

court orders such an appointment, the United

States Trustee shall appoint the trustee or examiner, "after consultation with parties in
301

interest."

The appointment

is

subject to the court's approval.

However, there

is

neither

a statute nor a legislative history that defines the scope of the court's discretion regarding

the approval.

1

302

Trustee Appointment

.

There are two instances where the court can order the appointment of a
the "for cause" standard

Pursuant to section

1

is

satisfied

and where the "best

interest" standard

trustee:

is

104(a)(1), a party in interest or the United States trustee

where

satisfied.

may

seek

the appointment of a trustee "for cause," including "fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or

mismanagement of

gross

after the

commencement of the

exclusive,

section

1 1

300
1

1

304

but

it

is

305

from

(1) to (5)

1

case."

303

The grounds

104(a)

Among

management,

listed in section

arguable that the "cause" includes

12(b) of the Code.

U.S.C. Section

301

1

either before or

104(a)(1) are not

some of the grounds

the nonexclusive ten factors

listed in

enumerated

in section

and (10) provide an arguable basis for seeking the appointment

& (b) (1994).

Section 1104(c).

Id.
302

1 1

12(b),

the affairs of the debtor by current

Hon. Susan Pierson DeWitt, Trustees, Interim Trustees, United States Trustee: Powers and Duties, 490

PLI/Comm7, 14(1989).
303
1 1

304

U.S.C. Section

According

1

104(a)(1) (1994).

to the rules

of construction, the words "includes" and "including" are not limiting. See

U.S.C. Section 102(3) (1994).
305

See

id.

Section

1 1

12(b) (1994).

1

62

of a trustee.

306

The

courts are in agreement that the time frame in which the court can

review current management's actions embraces activities both before and after the

commencement of the
The

case.

particular kinds of conduct that have been found to satisfy the "for cause"

standard include: inadequate accounting records and controls;

insurance either for the employees or for

conflicts of interest;

3

"

failure to

312

pay

tax;

also ordered the appointment of a trustee

the confidence of

306

See, e.g.. In re

its

property;

fraud;

313

Co.,

commingling of

and dishonesty.

creditors,

307

See

The

310

courts have

failed to garner

and prospective buyers.

315

in

possession experienced continuing

filing for relief).

In re Anniston Food-Rite, Inc.,

e.g.,

314

assets;

22 Bankr. 668, 671 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (The

bankruptcy court ordered the appointment of a trustee after the debtor

and unexplained losses following the

failure to obtain proper

where the current management

major secured creditors, unsecured

Horn & Hardart Baking

309

308

20 Bankr. 51

515 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982); In

1,

re

Mam

Line

Motors, Inc., 9 Bankr. 782, 784-85 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
308

See, e.g., In re

Brown, 31 Bankr. 583, 585 (D.D.C. 1983) (lack of adequate accounting controls of a cash
20 Bankr. 511,516 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982) (basic failure to

business); In re Anniston Food-Rite, Inc.,

grasp the elements of financial controls).
See, e.g., In re

(Bankr.

CD.

Brown, supra note 308,

at

585; In re Caroline Desert Disco,

Inc.,

5 Bankr. 536, 537

Cal. 1980) (failure to maintain necessary casualty, public liability and worker's compensation

insurance).
310

20 Bankr. 328, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (taking money out
504-05 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1983) (postpetition sale and commingling of the assets without court's approval).
311
See, e.g.. In re L. S. Good & Co., 8 Bankr. 312, 315 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1980) (stating that "the
magnitude of the number of inter-company transactions places current management ... in a position of
See, e.g., In re Philadelphia Athletic Club, Inc.,

of the debtor corporation's funds for personal use by the owner); In re Ford, 36 Bankr. 501

,

having grave potential conflicts of interest and ... the current management will be unable to make the

demanded in evaluating and pursuing inter-company claims.
La Sherene, Inc.), 3 Bankr. 169, 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980)

impartial investigations and decisions

Dardarian

v.

La Sherene,

(commingling of the
312

affairs

of the debtor

in

.

.

.");

possession and a related corporation).

Brown, supra note 308, at 585 (repeated failure to pay real estate taxes, resulting in additional
In re Great N.E. Lumber & Millwork Corp., 20 Bankr. 610, 61
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (failure

See, e.g.,

penalties);
to file
313

Inc. (In re

1

and pay sales

See, e.g., Hassett

tax).
v.

McColley

(In re

1982) (including lending institutions
related financial documents); In re

in

O.P.M. Leasing

Servs., Inc.), 16 Bankr. 932,

935 (Bankr. S.D.

NY.

fraud to purchase notes secured by fictitious and falsified leases and

Bonded Mailings,

Inc.,

20 Bankr. 781, 784 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1982)

(fraudulent activity designed to frustrate secured party's effort to enforce judgment).
314

See, e.g., In re

Deena Packaging

Indus., Inc.,

29 Bankr. 705, 707-08 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1983) (failure
La Sherene, supra note 31 1, at 175-76 (general

disclose relevant financial information in schedules);

dishonesty exemplified by desperate conduct
315

in

desperate situations).

Brown, 31 Bankr. 583, 585 (D. D.C. 1983) (an instance where the debtor's litigious
personality dissuaded interested parties from closing on sale or lease of the debtor's property); Smith v.
See, e.g., In re

to

63

In addition, the

appointment of a trustee has been ordered where the debtor

either has failed to

pay to a secured party

including, for example,

316

or has

in

possession

made unauthorized payments

payments on account of prepetition indebtedness.

"There are few situations which come to mind where grounds will exist for the
appointment of a trustee under subsection (a)(2) where 'cause' for such appointment
not exist under subsection (a)(1)"

results

from a difference

in point

318

because the difference between the two subsections

of view. While the former

is

understood from the

perspective of potential problems stemming from current management, the latter

viewed from the perspective of other

management. Thus, the same
standards at the

same

time.

standards would not, therefore,

not

uncommon

upon both the
courts,

parties that can be

courts' decisions that

mean

damaged by

management

activity of the

The

is

the conduct of the

will usually satisfy the

two

have applied either of the two

that the standard applied is exclusive. Indeed,

to find that courts' decisions ordering the

"for cause"

will

and the "best

appointment of a trustee

interests" standards at the

same

time.

319

however, have ordered the appointment of a trustee only under the "best

standard to investigate whether reorganization

is

possible.

320

Some

it is

rest

Some
interests"

other courts have

ordered the appointment of a trustee, for cause, where the debtor in possession failed to

Concord Coal Corp.

(In re

Concord Coal

Corp.),

1

1

Bankr. 552, 555 (Bankr. S.D. W.Va. 1981) (highly

unlikely that the debtor could gain and maintain confidence of secured lenders);
Inc. (In re

La Sherene,

Inc.), 3

Dardarian

v.

La Sherene.

Bankr. 169, 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (the debtor lacked managerial and

operational credibility, which threatened relationships with essential suppliers).
316

See, e.g.. In re McCall, 34 Bankr. 68, 69 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (the debtor's
payments for two years constituted gross mismanagement or incompetence).
317
318

See, e.g.. In re Eastern Consol. Utils., Inc., 3 Bankr. 591,

5 Collier on Bankruptcy % 1104. 01, at

1

104-22 to 23 (15

319

592
th

n. 3

failure to

make monthly

(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980).

ed. 1982).

Robert J. Berdan & Bruce G. Arnold, Displacing the Debtor in Possession: The Requisites for and
Advantages of the Appointment of a Trustee in Chapter II Proceedings, 67 Marq. L. Rev. 457, 482 (1984).
320
See, e.g., Hotel Assocs., Inc. v. Trustees of Cent. States S.E. & S. W. Areas Pension Fund (In re Hotel
Assocs., Inc.), 3 Bankr. 343,

346 (Bankr. E.D.

Pa. 1980).

64

maintain the confidence of the secured parties;

and where the individual debtor died

prison;

21

where the debtor was confined
had commenced.

after the case

"

in

The

bankruptcy courts have placed the burden of proof for the appointment of a trustee on the

moving

party

by "clear and convincing evidence."

for a trustee

The

and have repeatedly ruled

for a trustee

that the

movant must prove

the need

324

however, have been reluctant to order the appointment of a trustee under

courts,

the "best interests" standard in marginal cases. For example, the courts have declined to

order appointment of a trustee where current

complex industry or where

it

management had

was unclear whether a

trustee

a needed expertise in a

was more

likely to

successfully rehabilitate the debtor than the DIP. Similarly, the courts have sometimes

declined to order the appointment of a trustee where the intermediate option of appointing

an examiner under section

2.

104(b) proved to be more acceptable.

Examiner Appointment

According
of a trustee,

it

to Section

1

104(c) of the Code,

if

"shall order the appointment of an

investigation of the debtor

21

1

See, e.g.. Smith

v.

." 326
.

.

.

Concord Coal Corp.

The

the court does not order the appointment

examiner

to

conduct such an

statutory standard, "the interests of creditors, any

(In re

Concord Coal

Corp.),

1 1

Bankr. 552, 554 (Bankr. S.D.

W.

Va. 1981).
322
323

See, e.g., In re

New Haven

Radio, Inc., 23 Bankr. 762, 767 (S.D. N.Y. 1982).

643 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1226 (3rd Cir. 1989). See also Leonard L. Gumport,
The Bankruptcy Examiner, 20 Cal. Bankr. J. 71, 106 (1992).
325
See, e.g., In re Hamiel & Sons, Inc., 20 Bankr. 830, 832-33 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (because of the
costs of a trustee and the fact that the estate was not depleted, the court decided to order the appointment of
324

See, e.g., In re Smith, 6 Bankr. 641,
See, e.g., In re

an examiner to investigate the potential liabilities of principal officers and shareholders under alter ego
doctrine); In re

American Bulk Transport Co., 8 Bankr. 337, 340-41 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980)
it would be in 'best interests' of creditors to appoint an examiner).

not be needed, although
326
1 1

U.S.C. Section

1

104(c) (1994).

(a trustee

would

65

equity security holders, and other interests of the estate,"

appointment of a

trustee.

The movant must prove

examiner by clear and convincing evidence.

328

3

7

mirrors the standard for the

the need for the appointment of an

The

collective interest of

constituencies should be considered in the appointment of an examiner.

of the estate

interests, the interest

appointment,

this

is

all

of the

Among

such

the primary concern. Like the standard for trustee

standard also requires a comparison of the costs and the benefits of an

examiner appointment. The costs of an examiner are generally significantly lower than
those of a trustee because an examiner does not

not need to be compensated for a

management

C.

Roles of Trustees and Examiners

The

statutory language of Section

trustee or

examiner should

incompetence, and so on.

first

An

1

manage

the business

and therefore does

role.

104(a)(1) and (c) suggests that the appointed

investigate allegations of fraud, dishonesty,

independent third party

issues regarding the conduct of the

DIP and

is

often well suited to investigate

to provide an impartial, credible report.

impartial report helps the interested parties resolve disputed issues

agreement on a reorganization plan by bringing

to light facts

330

An

and reach an

and issues of concern

to the

327

Id.
328
"9

Leonard L. Gumport, The Bankruptcy Examiner, 20 Cal. Bankr.

A

few courts have granted examiners the authority

reorganization. E.g., In re

Market, Inc.,

1

1

John Peterson Motors,

J.

71, 106 (1992).

to run the business or otherwise to control the

Inc.,

47 B.R. 551 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); In re Liberal

B.R. 742 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio. 1981). Even though an examiner, except

court orders otherwise, performs the duties of a trustee,

1 1

U.S.C. Section

1

should be interpreted not to include the operation of the debtor's business under the

Code. Section

1

DIP

structure of the

106(b) authorizes an examiner to investigate and report, and to perform "any other duties of

the trustee that the court orders the debtor in possession not to perform."
330

to the extent that the

106(a)(3) and (b), such duties

Zaretsky, supra note 297, at 946.

66

parties.

331

Such investigation by a

current business but also

its

trustee or an

management before

investigative function of a third party

a smaller case, there

may

examiner can reach not only the debtor's
the

commencement

of the case.

"

The

particularly important in smaller cases because, in

is

not be an active creditors' committee and professionals

who

can

help supervise the DIP.

When

there

is

substantial evidence that the

DIP has been involved

mismanagement, or other conduct inconsistent with
appointment of a third party

is

mandatory.

333

In

its

in fraud,

gross

role as fiduciary for the estate, the

Chapter

1 1

cases, creditors and

shareholders have a strong interest in the operation of the business of the debtor and

the honest formulation of a reorganization or liquidation plan. If the

fraud or gross mismanagement,

and confidence. As a

cannot provide

it

result, the negotiation

Appointment of a

the case to failure.

its

in a position to benefit at the

committee may also have

whom

it

in

deals on unfair terms.

the intervention of a third party

come

to a

is

need for an independent third party

considerable potential for conflicts of interest.

expense of the
their

When
may

in

deadlock leading

the beneficiaries of avoidable transfers or

mind

engaged

trustee can be the proper solution to such a problem.

increases. In a reorganization case, there

be

is

various constituencies with comfort

process will likely

In particular, if there are conflicts of interest, the

The managers of the DIP may be

DIP

in

own

estate.

interests.

Members

may

otherwise

of the creditors'

The debtor may have

the appearance or fact of conflict

affiliates

becomes an

with

issue,

alleviate such difficulties. In addition, a trustee can

331

Id.
12
1 1

333

Id.

1991).

U.S.C. Section

See also,

1

104(a)(c) (1994).

e.g., In re U.S.

Communications of Westchester,

Inc.,

123 B.R. 491, 495 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y.

67

often pursue litigation on behalf of the estate

more

effectively than the

DIP

or a creditors'

committee.

The advantages associated with
drawbacks

that

undeniably exist

and

the creditors

in

the appointment of a third party often outweigh the

such appointment.

will bring a refreshing air of objectivity

Specifically, the trustee will probably

cooperate with the creditors

trustee,

of a plan.

in the pursuit

customers, or employees and

A

trustee will seek to benefit

and impartiality

it

all

to a business.

keep accurate and trustworthy records and

management of the business may make

The

334

try to

In addition, the trustee's objective

possible to cut off loyalties to favored suppliers,

off unprofitable or marginal divisions or product lines.

sell

through objective management, can also reduce the overhead by cutting off

inefficiencies, wastes,

The appointment of

equity shareholders.

advantageous

in

and excesses, thereby garnering the confidence
a third party

may

in the creditors

and

also prove to be particularly

cases where the court has an opportunity to appoint an individual or firm

with unique expertise or to counterbalance an otherwise ineffective creditors'

committee.

336

management

Most

in

importantly, the trustee

may be more experienced

than the current

dealing with the complexity of the reorganization process,

maximizing the chances of a successful reorganization

337

thereby

for the benefit of all parties to the

proceeding.

334

The expenses

related to a trustee, the trustee's being unfamiliar with the business, and the possibility of

discouraging the debtor from filing for relief would be some of the disadvantages. See generally
R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95
35

th

LoPucki, The Debtor

(Second Installment), 57
336

Id. at
37

In

Cong.,
in Full

s'

I

A & P H.

Sess. (1977) at 233.

—Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?

Control

Am Bankr. L.

J.

247, 257 (1983).

249.

some bankruptcy

districts,

such as Columbus, Ohio, and San Antonio, Texas, Chapter 13 standing

trustees run extensive credit-education, counseling,

These programs might increase the

and re-establishment programs for consumer debtors.

rate of successful reorganization. Jean Braucher,

Reorganization and Economic Development, 23 Cap. U. L. Rev. 499, 499 (1994)

Bankruptcy

n. 2.

68

The court can
words, a trustee

more

limit the roles of a trustee in operating the debtor's business. In other

may completely

deems

limited role. If the court

ongoing business operations,
retaining the current

replace the

it

that the current

management

is

or

may be

for day-to-day operations.

assigned a

important to the

can order the trustee to serve only an oversight

management

Except for being unable

management of the DIP

role,

338

to replace the operation of the debtor's day-to-day business,

an examiner performs the same duties as a trustee unless the court orders otherwise.

One

of the distinctive roles of an examiner

may

be appointed to mediate in deadlocked plan negotiations.

examiner appears

to be particularly useful

is

that an

when

examiner with expanded powers
340

Mediation by an

the period within

exclusively propose a reorganization plan has expired.

341

Once

which the DIP can

the exclusive period has

expired, any party can file a plan and attempt to obtain the agreement of other

constituencies.

342

Under

this

circumstance, an independent third party's plan

likely to obtain other parties agreement.

38

See, e.g.. In re

is

339

Madison Management Group, 137 B.R. 275 (Bankr. N.D.

1

341

1U.S.C. Section

99 B.R. 177 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1989)

Zaretsky, supra note 297, at 957.

342
1

343

106(b) (1994).

1

See, e.g., In re Public Serv. Co.,

1

U.S.C. Section

1

121(c) (1994).

Zaretsky, supra note 297, at 958.

more

343

111.

1992) (a trustee was

appointed to investigate causes of action available to the debtor and to pursue viable actions).
340

3

Chapter

V

Conclusion

When

Congress promulgated Chapter

operation of a business was best

left to

1 1

of the

existing

Code

1978,

in

it

thought that the

management. The current management

possesses the most familiarity with the business. Retention of existing

management

will

therefore enhance the effectiveness of the debtor's business operations and reduce the

cost of administration. Accordingly, the

control of

In

its

order to support the efficacy of the debtor

creditors.

who would

The mandatory

to oversee, monitor,

remain

bankruptcy court

in

in

possession concept, Congress created

balance the conflicting interests of the debtor and

creditors'

committee

is

one of them. The committee

and investigate the business operation by the debtor

to negotiate a plan. If the

examiner.

that the debtor will

business while negotiating the terms of a reorganization plan.

several participants

and

Code contemplates

may

committee

is

in

is

its

designed

possession

not enough to protect creditors' interests, the

order the appointment of an independent third party, a trustee or an

A trustee or an examiner investigates not only the conduct of the existing

management but

also the debtor's

economic and

financial situations.

expected to restore the confidence of other parties

in interest

The

third party

is

by impartial investigation

and objective evaluation of the debtor. The United States Trustee also plays a supervisory
role along with

its

case administration function. The bankruptcy courts' equity power

69

is

70

one of the most influential methods controlling the conduct of the debtor

even though the courts' role

However, the

realities

is

in

possession

principally limited to the judicial function.

of bankruptcy practice have proved to be different from what

Congress contemplated. Despite Congress's original intention, both the creditors'

committee and the appointment of a

third party

have not functioned well. Creditors are

often apathetic to the reorganization process. Moreover, in

creditors'

committee does not even

exist.

The appointment of a

the courts regard the appointment of a trustee or an

that

counterproductive and against the policies underlying the

majority of cases the

the inception of the case without

DIP can enjoy

much

its

small cases, the

third party

is

rare because

examiner as an extraordinary remedy.

Absent extraordinary circumstances, the courts consider

result, in the

many

such an appointment

DIP

is

construct of the Code.

As

a

exclusivity for at least 120 days from

intervention. Moreover, the exclusive period can

be extended easily. The courts' deep-rooted respect for the

DIP concept

gives

many

incentives to a debtor to file for reorganization relief even though the debtor does not

have a going concern value. The result
effort, the

1 1

case

cases have

still fails.

managed

is

that after a lengthy

and expensive reorganization

Empirical studies show that less than 30 percent of the Chapter

to get a

confirmed plan and that about half of the debtors whose

plans have been confirmed have again experienced financial difficulties.

One of the

important factors contributing to such unsuccessful reorganizations has

been that businesses not eligible for reorganization efforts nonetheless attempt to
reorganize. Debtors without going concern value and those that abuse the automatic stay

do not deserve rehabilitation

efforts. If a reorganization

case

fails,

considerable costs

remain without any desirable outcome. The costs are borne by the creditors, and

in the

71

long run society as a whole shares them. Unlike successful business rehabilitation, a

failing case has

no ground

to justify such expenses.

The

costs incurred by debtors not

deserving reorganization cannot be justified even though the presupposed "possible

misuse of resources"

The
in

344

taken into account.

is

thesis suggests that bankruptcy courts

more

actively

manage reorganization cases

order to reduce the costs incurred by the filings of ineligible debtors. Provided that the

courts adequately utilize the existing legal devices established under the Code, the costs

would be reduced dramatically.
faith filing.

First, the court

can use the threshold requirement of good

This requirement has been developed by some courts to prevent abusive or

non-viable debtors from taking advantage of the reorganization

can utilize Section

stay).

Second, the court

12(b) (conversion or dismissal) and Section 362(d) (relief from the

These sections can help terminate some pending cases on the grounds of abuse or

futility

more

1 1

relief.

of the case. Third, the appointment of a trustee or an examiner should be used

frequently. Section

1

104 of the Code provides some circumstances under which the

appointment of a trustee or an examiner
utilization of Section

Under

105 of the Code

this section, the courts

may

is

is

mandatory. Fourth and most importantly, the

a useful

method

take any action and

to expedite reorganization cases.

may make any

determination

necessary to enforce a court order or rule to prevent an abuse of the process on a sua

sponte basis.

Many courts

methods

would help them administer

that

are

now

Mediation based on Section 105

344

N.L.R.B.

v.

Bildisco

&

Bildisco,

is

using Section 105 as a ground for creating

a

a case

more

good example.

465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984).

efficiently

new

and expeditiously.

72

There are many provisions and doctrines

more

reorganization process

that suggest the courts participate in the

actively to protect creditors' rights. Nevertheless, the courts

are extremely reluctant to get out of their deep-rooted respect for the debtor in possession

construct of the Code.

Compared

to the

bankruptcy practice of Canada, that of the United

States overprotects the debtors at the expense of the creditors.

Such lukewarm
decision

attitudes,

attitudes of the courts

would cause mistakes.
it

courts, for

In

the

result

from a fear

most cases, because the DIP

submits information regarding

its

DIP

reveal

its

financial

because the debtor's managers
before they finally

to the creditors

file

ready.

is

It is

and economic

may have been

premature

aware of the

to order the

DIP

courts'

Then

the

to file the

possible and necessary for the courts to

realities at the early stage

of the process

preparing for bankruptcy for a long time

the petition. If credible financial information of the debtor

immediately after the

filing,

The bankruptcy

administer reorganization cases.

No

shown

in the

courts of the United States should

one believes

in

bankruptcy

more

actively

preserving businesses destined to

and a debtor that abuses the rehabilitation scheme does not deserve
debtor eligible for survival.

comes

a substantial portion of debtors not worth

saving would be kept out of the reorganization process, as
practice of Canada.

is

that a

business as late as possible.

example, can use Section 105(d) of the Code

disclosure statement before a plan

make

may

to

fail,

be called an honest
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